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Abstract
The current co-operative strategy literature places heavy 
emphasis on bilateral co-operation: to take just three
examples, joint ventures, partnerships and strategic 
alliances. Industry wide co-operation however has received 
less attention. In addition, there has been little research 
devoted to the formation of such alliances. Therefore this 
research attempts to discover more about this type of co­
operation and how it is encapsulated into formal 
structures.
Empirical research was conducted on industry wide co­
operation among Irish companies. The methodology chosen 
was inductive and exploratory. In total, three major and 
a number of minor case studies were completed.
Comparative analysis indicates that there are a number of 
precisely definable stages through which such industry-wide 
co-operation will proceed before it formalises or 
crystallises. It also highlights a number of factors that 
drive co-operation from one stage to the next. The most 
important of these are non-economic. It further suggests 
that the reason for initial industry wide co-operation may 
differ from the reasons which sustains the co-operation. 
The implications of these and other findings are discussed.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1
As trade barriers continue to fall, and as the economies of 
the world converge towards a global economy, companies are 
being confronted with a whole host of new strategic issues. 
In the past, with protected domestic markets, a firm's 
primary concern was to develop its competitive strategy vis 
a vis other firms in the market. However, in more recent 
years, many firms are viewing these competitors as allies 
in the global economy.
The growth of alliances, joint ventures, consortia and 
other co-operative forms has been a major trend in many 
industries around the world including automotive, computer, 
semiconductor, aerospace and financial services for 
instance. By 1994, for instance, IBM had entered an 
estimated 4000 alliances, NEC had entered 130 and the 
number of strategic alliances worldwide was growing at an 
estimated 30% per year, (Rigby and Buchanan, 1994).
In the light of these developments, there has been an 
increasing interest in the study of co-operation and co­
operative strategies from a strategic management 
perspective. Initially, management scholars were primarily 
concerned with the reasons for co-operation and the 
different types of co-operation that existed. However, 
more recently there has been an increasing interest the 
process by which this co-operation forms between companies 
in an effort to understand how a successful alliance works.
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Existing process studies concentrate on formation processes 
for co-operation that occurs between small numbers of 
companies, typically two or three. However, co-operation 
can also be evident in an entire industry where most if not 
all of the companies in the business cooperate with each 
other to some extent. Examples of this include industry 
associations and collusion. This co-operation can
radically transform the basic structural characteristics of 
entire industries. This can have both positive and 
negative effects on the firms within those industries. 
However, little research has been conducted on how this 
type of co-operation is structured within industries.
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how co­
operation at the overall level of the industry forms. Such 
research is of interest to academics. However it is of 
particular potential benefit to practitioners: those
individuals or government agencies who seek to promote or 
establish co-operation at the overall level of the 
industry.
Chapter two contains a literature review on co-operative 
strategy. It is designed to give the reader an
understanding of the various types of co-operative 
strategies, why co-operation is used and how co-operation 
emerges in industries. It introduces the research 
methodology and highlights some issues and problems in 
collecting qualitative data. This research is primarily 
inductive and exploratory, using a case based approach.
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Chapter three contains three major and a number of minor 
case studies. The major case studies are concerned with 
process issues. These feature how industry wide co­
operative strategies formed in three Irish industries; a 
homogenous products industry, contract mouldmaking industry 
and the potato industry. A pilot study during the earlier 
phases of this research revealed an important form of 
industry wide co-operation, informal co-operation. For 
completeness, a number of minor cases featuring informal 
co-operation are included to examine this phenomenon.
Chapter four is a detailed analysis of the data in 
conjunction with the relevant literature. The analysis 
contains a number of findings. It suggests that industry 
wide co-operation can go through a number of phases, 
emergence, transition and maturity. The reason for which 
companies in an industry can change over time, and there 
are a number of important drivers of this process. 
Informal co-operation is also discussed. Its prevalence in 
a wide variety of industries is highlighted, and a number 
of possible explanations for its existence are suggested.
Finally, chapter five contains a number of conclusions and 
recommendations for practitioners and also future research 
on this topic. One of the key considerations for 
practitioners is to understand the true nature of industry 
wide co-operation among competitors.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
5
Introduction
This literature review is designed to provide the reader 
with a broad appreciation of the strategic management 
literature on co-operative strategy. In particular, it 
illustrates the need for additional research to be 
completed on industry wide co-operation and its formation 
processes.
This chapter is divided into a number of sections. The 
first briefly describes co-operative strategy in general 
terms, and it draws the distinction between firm and 
industry level co-operation.
The second section shows that much of the literature deals 
with firm level co-operation. It reviews how much of this, 
if any, can be extended to industry level co-operation. 
Two main types of industry wide co-operation are 
highlighted that are based on the nature of linkages 
between firms. The benefits and risks of firm level co­
operation are examined, and finally there is a discussion 
on how these risks can be limited.
The third section outlines a number of prevalent forms of 
industry wide co-operation. Benefits and risks are 
discussed, and some ways of limiting these risks are 
reviewed.
6
Section four reviews the current literature on co-operative 
strategy formation processes for both firm level and 
industry level co-operation. The majority of this work 
concerns firm level co-operation. Only three studies in 
the literature concern formation processes for industry 
level co-operation.
The Pettigrew (1985) contextualist framework is suggested 
in section five as suitable for investigating some of the 
questions raised by this review on industry level co­
operation and its formation processes. Finally, a number 
of aspects of the research process are briefly discussed.
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2.1 What is a Co-operative Strategy ?
Traditionally, the task for management was to devise a 
competitive strategy for the company, (Porter, 1980) . All 
firms in the marketplace, for example buyers, suppliers, 
and competitors competed for profit. One firm gained at 
the expense of the other, and the market place was 
conceptualised as a battlefield, where there were winners 
and losers.
However, " business policy's ...' [b]attlefield analogy' 
must be de-emphasised. Exaggerated somewhat, the field 
seems obsessed with competitive survival", (Astley, 1984, 
p. 533) . This statement suggests that there is another 
strategic alternative available to managers, this is co­
operative strategy. With a co-operative strategy there can 
be winners and winners, one firm need not necessarily gain 
at the expense of the other. Both can gain.
A co-operative strategy can be defined as, "[t]he joint 
mobilisation of resources and the formulation of action 
within collectives of organisations", (Astley and Fombrun, 
1983, p. 578). It is "the joint actions by organisations 
on matters of strategic importance", (Astley, 1984, p. 
527) . Co-operative strategies are long term relationships 
between firms that link aspects of their businesses but 
fall short of a merger on the one hand, and a reliance on 
market transactions on the other, (Porter and Fuller, 1986;
8
Thorelli, 1986). The emphasis of a co-operative strategy 
is for firms to cooperate as opposed to compete to maximise 
profits. Firms cooperate to achieve a strategic purpose 
which one firm, if it were acting alone, could not
optimally achieve.
Many terms have been used to describe firm level co­
operative relations between companies, for instance, joint 
ventures (Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Harrigan, 1983, 
1988); alliances (Bleeke and Ernst, 1995; Devlin and
Bleakley, 1988; James, 1985; Lorange et al, 1992; Ohmae, 
1994); coalitions (Porter and Fuller, 1986); partnerships, 
(Lewis, 1990; Pelmutter and Heenan, 1986), consortia,
(Browning et al, 1995); strategic out-sourcing, (Quinn and 
Hilmer, 1994); spider's web strategies (Gullander, 1976),
trade associations, (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Porter, 
1990; Staber and Aldrich, 1983); federations, (Oliver, 
1990; D'Aunno and Zuckerman, 1987) and co-operatives, (Roy, 
1981)
Within these broad categories there are also sub-categories 
of co-operation between companies. These are usually based 
on the legal and organisational arrangement of the co­
operative strategy, (Contractor and Lorange, 1988). Some 
researchers, for instance, have developed typologies of 
joint ventures based on the purpose for which they were 
created, (Harrigan, 1983; Contractor and Lorange, 1988). 
Two prominent forms or sub-groups of joint ventures include
9
licensing and franchising, for example.
However, co-operative strategies can be divided into two 
basic categories, firm level co-operation and industry 
level co-operation. Firm level co-operation concerns co­
operation between small numbers of firms within an 
industry, typically two or three. Industry level co­
operation, on the other hand, concerns co-operation between 
all or most firms in an industry. Both of these types have 
different structural characteristics, and the current 
literature places heavy emphasis on firm level co­
operation.
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2 .2 Firm Level Co-operation
The first major group of co-operative strategies that are 
examined in this literature review are those that occur 
between small numbers of firms, typically two or three. 
Firm level co-operation can occur in two basic forms, 
strategic alliances and partnering. An understanding of 
the distinction between these two types of co-operative 
strategies requires an analysis of the linkages that occur 
between firms when they cooperate.
2.2.1 Linkages Between Firms
An appreciation of the nature of inter-firm co-operation 
requires an understanding of how certain aspects of 
businesses are linked. The value chain (Porter, 1985) is 
a useful analytical tool with which these linkages can be 
investigated.
The value chain desegregates a firm into its strategically 
relevant activities. These activities are the building 
blocks of competitive advantage. Firms gain competitive 
advantage by performing these strategically relevant 
activities cheaper, or better, than their competitors. The 
value chain is not a collection of independent activities, 
it is a system of interdependent activities which form 
linkages to create value.
11
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-----Figure 1: The Value Chain (Porter, 1985, p. 37)
Linkages can occur within the firm and between the value 
chains of the focal company and it buyers, suppliers and 
competitors, (Porter, 1985; Porter and Fuller, 1986) . 
These linkages can be a valuable source of competitive 
advantage. Examples of these include closer coordination 
of schedules, co-operation on process and product 
improvements, and joint action on cost reductions to help 
reduce inventory investment and improve profit margins. 
These higher levels of coordination can result in 
delivering increased levels of quality and service to
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upstream customers and end users. Linkages have allowed 
companies such as Marks and Spencer to achieve closer 
coordination. This gives higher levels of responsiveness, 
quality, and delivery at unrivalled prices, while also 
allowing the supplier to make a reasonable margin, 
(Montgomery, 1991) .
2.2.2 Strategic Alliances and Partnering
The value chain suggests that there are two basic types of 
linkages that exist between companies in inter-firm co­
operative agreements. The first type are linkages across 
activities in the value chains of companies, ie linkages 
between buyers and suppliers, (non-competitors). These 
provide a tighter coordinating mechanism than an arms 
length transaction, but they do not go as far as a vertical 
merger, (Porter and Fuller, 1986) . The second type are 
linkages within activities in the value chains of 
companies, for example, between competitors. This type of 
co-operation involves similar inputs from competing 
organisations, however, it falls short of a horizontal 
merger. For example, in the strategic alliance between JVC 
and Thompson, who both make VCRs, Thompson learns about 
product technology and manufacturing prowess. JVC learns 
how to succeed in the fragmented European market, (Hamel et 
al, 1989) .
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(i) Co-operation Between Non-Competitors: Partnering.
A partnership is a long term co-operative relationship 
between non-competitors. Typical examples of this include 
buyer-supplier relationships (Dwyer et al, 1987). In
partnerships, each firm contributes distinctive but 
complementary resources to the relationship, (Contractor 
and Lorange, 1988). This type of co-operation involves the 
identification of the activities in which the firm is well 
positioned and the acquisition, through co-operation, those 
activities that the firm cannot perform effectively and 
efficiently 'in house', (Porter and Fuller, 1986; Jarillo,
1988).
The Ford Motor Company has improved the aerodynamic look of 
its cars by developing partnerships with its suppliers. A 
good example of this is the partnership between Ford and 
Excel Industries, a leading glass fabricator in the US. In 
recent years the window area in cars has grown 
dramatically. This trend, coupled with new aerodynamic 
designs requires novel approaches to the combination of 
glass and body designs so that a smooth integrated 
appearance is achieved. Traditionally, auto makers 
specified window designs to fit car designs. These new 
trends in styling and aerodynamics call for greater 
coordination between window shaping possibilities and 
advanced body concepts at the early clay model stage of 
auto design.
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This requires a long term close relationship between the 
window supplier and the car maker. It commences with 
design. It continues for several years through the various 
design and engineering stages to the stage at which the 
vehicles are finally manufactured and ready for sale. The 
firms must be confident of their mutual commitments and 
abilities over this period. To build these tight links, 
Ford and Excel Industries have created an alliance that 
enables their respective engineers to operate as a single 
team over the period of auto design. Excel Industries pays 
its own costs. However, it has a long term supply 
arrangement and it is assured of 70% of Ford's business, 
(Lewis, 1990) .
This type of relationship has also been called strategic 
out-sourcing of non-core activities, (Quinn and Hilmer, 
1994) . This allows firms to concentrate on a smaller 
number of what can be termed core competencies, (Prahalad 
and Hamel, 1990) . Core competencies are not core products, 
they are skills and knowledge based. They are difficult to 
replicate. They are limited in number and embedded in the 
company's organisational systems. Core competencies may be 
termed the glue that binds a company together. They are 
the collective learning in the organisation. They 
coordinate the diverse production skills and integrate 
multiple streams of technologies. Examples of companies 
which have cooperated to develop strong core competencies 
are: Honda (power trains), Sony (miniaturisation) and 3M
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(bonding technologies), (Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; Prahalad 
and Hamel, 1990; Quinn et al, 1990).
Ideally, partnering will occur when performing an activity 
with a partner is superior to performing the activity 
internally on the one hand, and relying on arms length
transactions with other firms on the other. This will
depend on the types of activities involved. Some are
inherently more expensive than others, for example, 
technology development may be more expensive than marketing 
in some organisations.
(ii) Co-operation Between Competitors: Strategic Alliances
James (1984, p. 115) defines strategic alliances as
"...common combat strategies which are formed to serve
common interests such as preserving the balance of
marketing power, controlling spheres of influence and 
protecting the corporate interests of the firm". According
to Pelmutter and Heenan, (1986, p. 317) "...[t]heir
relationship is organised along horizontal not vertical 
lines, technology exchanges, resource pooling and other 
'soft' forms or combination are the rule." Therefore, 
strategic alliances are therefore long term co-operative 
relationships between firms who are often, although not 
always, competitors. The relationship is horizontal. 
However it falls short of a merger. Firms co-operating
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through strategic alliances contribute similar resources to 
the relationship, (Contractor and Lorange, 198 8; Porter and 
Fuller, 1986).
A good example of a long term strategic alliance is the 13 
year old alliance between Ford and Mazda. Mazda teaches 
Ford about manufacturing and engineering, for example, just 
in time manufacturing. Ford teaches Mazda about design, 
finance and international marketing. Ford's Hermosillo 
plant in Mexico which manufactures the top selling Mercury 
Tracer, is modelled on Mazda's super-efficient factory in 
Hofu, Japan. One of every four Ford cars sold in the US in 
1992 benefitted to some degree from Mazda's involvement, 
while two out of every five Mazda's showed the Ford stamp, 
(Hensler, 1993) .
The New United Motors Manufacturing (NUMMI) co-operative 
venture between General Motors (GM) and Toyota is another 
example of a strategic alliance between two competitors. 
Toyota's objectives in NUMMI was to learn how to work with 
American employees and suppliers. GM wanted to understand 
and adapt Toyota's skills for improved quality and lower 
costs. This was seen to be a fair trade. Alliances in the 
pharmaceutical and chemical industries are also common due 
to the large costs associated with research and 
development, (Farrands, 1989) .
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Like partnering, firms form strategic alliances to improve 
certain aspects of their respective value chains and core 
competencies. Ideally, in a strategic alliance, this is 
achieved by each firm learning and adapting the best 
practices and principles of the other in a series of 
exchanges over the life of the alliance. Alternatively, it 
is achieved by each firm contributing similar resources to 
the alliance for a common purpose.
2.2.3 Benefits of Strategic Alliances and Partnering
The underlying benefits of co-operation are that it can 
reduce costs and risks and improve corporate strategies. 
A co-operative strategy's potential for reducing costs and 
risks for companies has been well documented (Aldrich, 
1979; Bresser ,1988; Bresser and Harl, 1986; Oliver, 1990; 
Pennings, 1981; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). However a co­
operative strategy must be formulated in conjunction with 
a firm's overall strategy for competing in an industry, 
(Porter and Fuller, 1986; Jarillo, 1988). Ideally, firms 
become more competitive by using co-operation to strengthen 
key aspects of their value chains and core competencies. 
Strategic out-sourcing may allow a firm to concentrate 
internal effort on a few key processes. Alternatively, a 
strategic alliance may allow access to new technologies for 
the development of superior products.
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While these represent the underlying rationale for co­
operation, the literature suggests that there are a number 
of more specific reasons for inter-firm co-operation:
(i) Market/Resource Access.
One of the most important reasons for firms co-operating is 
their need to access certain markets or resources, (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978) . Developing markets can be a time 
consuming, costly, and risky process for companies. 
Alliances and partnerships are used to reduce costs, risks 
and the time taken to develop new markets.
A good example of how co-operation can improve market 
access is the case of Tagamet versus Zantac in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Smithkline's Tagamet was the 
first ulcer 'wonder drug' and for several years it had the 
market to itself. Annual sales of this product approached 
a billion dollars, generating half of Smithkline's profits.
The British company, Glaxo, then created Zantac, which had 
similar properties. To build Zantac sales, Glaxo teamed up 
with Switzerland's Hoffman La Roche. These two companies 
assembled a marketing force of five thousand sales people, 
which simply 'out gunned' SmithKline's sales force of one 
thousand five hundred people. Despite the fact that the 
drugs were basically alike, Tagamet sales fell and Zantac
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became the market leader, (Lewis, 1990)
The importance of using co-operation to access markets and 
resources is becoming more apparent due to the continuing 
trend towards the globalisation of world markets, 
(Badaracco, 1991; Ohmae, 1994) . "... [g]lobalisation refers
to a rethinking of traditional perspectives that reveals 
the world economy as a single market, unimpeded by national 
boundaries." (Badaracco, 1991, p. 18). More specifically, 
this means that consumer preferences in many countries are 
converging. Ohmae (1991, p. 37) refers to this as the 
" [c]aliforniazation of need". Consumers world wide are 
less concerned with the country of origin of a product and 
are more concerned with the quality, price and image of 
these products.
Firms may also need to cooperate to gain access to markets 
which are strictly controlled by governments, (Porter and 
Fuller, 1986). In this case a firm may ally itself with a 
local firm to gain access to markets with lower labour 
costs perhaps. Co-operating with local companies can also 
be a successful market penetration strategy for customising 
products for those local markets, (Roberts, 1980) .
An example of this is in South Korea where import 
restrictions on personal computers have resulted in IBM 
negotiating with Hyundai on a co-operative venture to 
produce the IBM 5550 personal computer. Mexican government
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value added requirements have influenced Ford's decision to 
enter into an alliance with a Mexican company to build 
400,000 unit engine plant in Mexico to serve its US and 
Canadian operations, (Contractor and Lorange, 1988).
Companies may also wish to cooperate to produce better 
advertising, open new marketing channels, gain better 
channel control and also ensure improved supply. For
instance, the Pilkington group in the UK uses alliances to 
secure strong supply relations in Japan. Pilkington 
provides glass for two thirds of all Japanese made
sunglasses. To ensure its ties to firms that cut, edge, 
harden and polish the glass, Pilkington gives them the 
necessary technical and other help. It has also won their 
allegiance by buying and exporting sizeable quantities of 
finished lenses from them, (Lewis, 1990) .
(ii) Technology Acquisition.
The pace of change in many technology based markets is now
so fast that it can be more valuable to have the right
technology when needed regardless of the origins of that 
technology, (Lewis, 1990). Today's products rely on so 
many different critical technologies that most companies 
can no longer maintain cutting edge sophistication in all 
of them, (Ohmae, 1994).
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In addition, shorter product life cycles add momentum to 
the need to develop new and innovative products and to 
exploit them widely, (Devlin and Bleakley, 1988). To cover 
gaps in product lines and to supplement internal 
innovation, companies in many industries are increasing 
their search for new technology by developing alliances 
with other companies, (James, 1985).
The fixed cost of technological development has also risen 
dramatically in recent years, (Ohmae, 1994; Porter and 
Fuller, 1986). For instance, in the automotive industry it 
is not uncommon for development costs to exceed one billion 
dollars, as in the case of Ford's 'Mondeo' motor car. 
Therefore, firms need to maximise revenue from these 
technological developments (Contractor and Lorange, 1988; 
Ohmae, 1994) and they also need to share the costs of this 
development with other firms, (Ohmae, 1994) . IBM spends 
more than £ 5 billion dollars per year on R & D, and makes 
most of its own chips. Despite this, it has turned to GE, 
Intel, Rockwell, Texas Instruments and other firms for 
needed chip technologies which it could not develop alone, 
(Lewis, 1990) .
Acquiring technology not only shortens development time and 
reduces cost, it can also add value, thus creating superior 
products, (Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Lewis, 1990). 
Alliances can assist companies in providing more value 
whilst the product is in use, they can offer a stronger
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product line and they can create new or improved 
performance. For example, Baxter Travenol, the US medical 
products company, solved hospitals' costly problem of 
having to mix unstable drugs with intravenous solutions 
just before use. Baxter combined what it knew about fluid 
stability and plastics formulation with the knowledge of 
drug makers Merck and Smithkline to produce stable premixed 
solutions, (Lewis, 1990).
(iii) Improve Operations.
Co-operation has frequently been used by companies to 
increase the efficiency of operations by sharing 
production, (Neilsen, 1990; Porter and Fuller, 1986). This 
strategy has been used in many businesses which have excess 
capacity and high production costs, thus using production 
facilities more efficiently. In 1989, due to capacity 
shortages in producing the 747-400 aircraft, Boeing turned 
to its rival, Lockheed, for a loan of six hundred workers. 
This provided Boeing with experienced technicians, and it 
also allowed Lockheed to retain a skilled workforce until 
new business could be developed, (Lewis, 1990).
General Motors uses co-operative arrangements with Isuzu 
and Suzuki to produce trans-axles in Japan for assembly in 
the US. Brazil serves as a source of small engines for 
Ford's US and European markets due to comparatively lower
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production costs. (Contractor and Lorange, 1988). Co­
operation can also be used to improve processes within 
companies, for instance, Xerox has shared cost saving plant 
design concepts with Kodak, (Lewis, 1990) .
(iv) Changing the Competitive Structure of Industries.
Co-operation can shape the competitive structure of an 
industry. It can fundamentally alter the power dependence 
relations in an industry, for example by creating alliances 
to attack leaders, (Porter, 1985; Porter and Fuller, 1986). 
For example, Airbus Industries, is a coalition of a number 
of smaller, weaker, European aircraft producers which have 
combined to become a world class competitor, (Porter, 
1985) .
Caterpillar formed an alliance with Mitsubishi in Japan in 
order to put pressure on the profits and market of their 
common competitor, Komatsu. Japan is Komatsu's main 
market, where it generates 80% of its global cash flow. 
Even if the venture was not a success in the Japanese 
market it may have had an impact on Komatsu's ability to 
compete worldwide, (Hout, Porter and Rudden, 1982)
Co-operation can successfully penetrate markets when entry 
barriers are high, due to scale economies such as high 
capital costs, (Porter, 1980). Firms may need to reach a
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larger scale to compete in certain markets effectively, 
this can be a time consuming process. However by co­
operating with other firms such scale economies could be 
reached in a shorter time frame.
Co-operation has also been used by many firms in an 
industry to block new competition, or to limit existing 
competition. Firms in oligopolies, where there are a few 
large players may collude to fix prices, (Cohen and Cyert, 
1965) . Industry price leadership is a tacit form of 
collusion based on imitation where one company is the 
acknowledged leader in setting prices, (Bresser, 1988; 
Porter, 1980).
(v) Organisational Learning.
One of the most important reasons for forming alliances and 
partnerships is to develop and enhance a company's pool of 
knowledge, for example, its core competencies, (Prahalad 
and Hamel, 1990). Organisational learning can be developed 
by organisations working closely with one another and 
adopting each others' practices and principles. It is 
closely associated with technology acquisition, however, it 
has a broader focus, it also extends to management 
practices and cultures.
Ford's alliance with Mazda has facilitated cultural changes
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at Ford. Driven by serious competitive problems in the 
early 1980s, Ford began to reorient its culture to focus 
more on people, customers, and quality. The new culture 
developed at Ford, focused on building and reinforcing 
those processes needed to ensure the growth of relevant 
strengths in Ford's management, decision making and 
manufacturing. (Lewis, 1990).
Hamel et al, (1989), suggest that in the 1980s Japanese
companies formed alliances with Western companies to learn 
about Western companies' skills and technologies. for 
example, in the joint venture between Honda and Rover, 
Honda cultivated skills in European styling and marketing, 
whilst Rover cooperated only to avoid investments in engine 
design, (Hamel et al, 1989) . As a result, Honda emerged
the dominant partner.
Co-operation can also develop a company's core competencies 
in other important ways. By sharing non-core activities 
with others, alliances can focus internal efforts on the 
core competencies of the company, (Lewis, 1990; Prahalad 
and Hamel, 1990; Quinn and Hilmer, 1994). The Japanese 
Semiconductor company, NEC, by 1987 had used over 100 
alliances which were aimed at building competencies rapidly 
and at low cost. (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) .
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(vi) Speculative Reasons.
There are also speculative reasons for firms co-operating. 
Here, co-operation may occur for vague reasons as opposed 
to specific technological development and market access 
reasons. For example, firms may not always know the best 
course of action to take when developing a market and 
therefore they may wish to cooperate to spread the risk. 
Wendy's International, the hamburger chain, and the US ice 
cream maker Baskin Robins used an alliance to explore the 
drawing power of their combined product lines. To do this 
they added an ice cream parlour to some of the Wendy's 
outlets, (Lewis, 1990).
Some companies enter co-operative agreements for fashion 
and fear reasons, (Devlin and Bleakley, 1988). As 
companies witness more of their competitors forming 
alliances they follow suit. One of the motives for the 
alliance between Mitsubishi Motors of Japan, and Hyundai of 
South Korea for the design an manufacture of low price cars 
was to pre-empt any potential alliance between Hyundai and 
one of Mitsubishi's Japanese competitors.
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(vii) Multiple contingencies.
As the previous analysis suggests, there are a wide variety 
of reasons for firms in industries to cooperate. An 
important point in this regard is that the decision to 
cooperate is usually based on multiple contingencies, 
(Oliver, 1990). Porter and Fuller, (1986), refer to these 
as multiple activity coalitions. They arise because 
certain activities are inexorably linked and there is a 
need for coordination between activities for example 
marketing and technological development. It may also be 
easier to reach an overall agreement for several activities 
rather than negotiating several separate agreements. 
Honda, for example, cooperated with Rover to gain a 
foothold in the European car market (market access) as well 
as developing its design skills (learning).
2.2.4 Strategic Risks of Firm Level Co-operation.
(i) Strategic Risks of Partnering
Quinn and Hilmer (1994) outline three possible risks of 
partnering through strategically out-sourcing non-core 
activities, these are; the loss of critical skills or 
developing the wrong skills, loss of cross functional 
skills and the loss of control over a supplier.
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Many companies have out-sourced what was believed to be 
only small items such as semiconductor chips and taught 
suppliers how to build them. These suppliers later 
supplied competing firms with these items or perhaps 
stopped supplying the firms who originally out-sourced the 
components. By this time, is was often too late for the 
companies who originally out-sourced the components to try 
to develop these competencies once more, (Gugler, 1992). 
Strategic out-sourcing can lead to loss of strategic 
flexibility for the company, (Ansoff, 1984), examples of
this would be not being able to introduce new product 
designs, or perhaps not being able to respond to 
competition effectively due to underdeveloped competencies.
Interactions between skilled people in different functional 
activities in organisations can often produce innovative 
solutions to problems. Strategically out-sourcing certain 
activities can damage these synergies. The 3M 'Post It' 
note was as a result of a mistake made by a chemist whilst 
trying to produce a very strong adhesive. In reality, a 
very weak adhesive was produced and as a result of telling 
colleagues of the error the 'Post It' note was conceived 
(Peters and Waterman, 1982). Out-sourcing can place this 
synergy at risk by removing critical elements.
Partnering requires ongoing coordination between the 
partners which involves considerable management time and 
money. Coordination may prove difficult to achieve as
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partners have divergent interests and each partner may want 
to play a bigger role than the other. Therefore, getting 
partner support is not always easy. Co-operation requires 
that each partner perform their activities to the optimum 
standard and this implies increased cost. For example, a 
firm may not be able to persuade its partner in a 
manufacturing coalition to perform enough inspection, 
because after sales service costs fall outside the 
coalition, (Porter and Fuller, 1986) . To maintain control 
some companies in partnerships even go to the extreme of 
owning the piece of equipment that their partner uses to 
produce the out-sourced components, (Quinn and Hilmer, 
1994).
(ii) Strategic Risks of Alliances
Hamel et al, (1989) Hamel and Prahalad, (1989) and Prahalad 
and Hamel, (1990), suggest that strategic alliances are 
actually competition in a different guise. Firms compete 
for knowledge and alliances can become learning races 
between organisations. Japanese companies, for instance, 
were intent on learning from Western companies when they 
entered a number of alliances in the 1980s. They digested 
the skills of their Western counterparts and this enabled 
them to become better competitors in the longer term. This 
learning came in the form of every day, small discrete 
steps, asking questions and requesting designs. Strategic
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alliance between Japanese companies and Taiwanese or Korean 
companies on the other hand are uncommon as each company 
"does not want to open the Kimono.", (Hamel et al 1989, p. 
135) .
Conflicts of interest can arise between organisations due 
to the need to conceal and share strategic information 
between competitors, (Bresser, 1988). The advantage of 
co-operative strategies is stability through predictability 
as it establishes linkages or channels through which 
information may be shared, (Fombrun and Astley, 1983) . 
However, this is a disadvantage where competitive strategy 
is concerned as it can lead to unintended information 
disclosure, (Bresser, 1988), which may have undesired 
consequences for competitive strategies. Therefore the 
greatest risks of co-operation are that it can create a 
competitor or make an existing competitors more formidable, 
through the transfer of expertise and market access.
For example, in the NUMMI alliance between Toyota and GM, 
outlined previously, Toyota needed to apply what it had 
learned to just one US plant. Transferring its NUMMI 
experience was a matter of hiring employees who met 
Toyota's criteria and adapting human resource and supplier 
lessons from the venture. Toyota's management style was 
already aligned with its human resource based production 
methods.
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GM, by contrast, had to introduce its lessons into scores 
of existing plants. The numbers alone made GM's task much 
harder. An even greater barrier came from GM's culture. 
Effective worker involvement required basic changes 
reaching to the highest levels of management levels. GM 
also faced deep-seated employee resistance which was 
derived from decades of mistrust.
Therefore, Toyota was better prepared to reap the benefits 
from co-operation due to its organisational structure and 
also the structure of the agreement. It gained these 
benefits quickly and proceeded to increase its market share 
and capacity. GM, on the other hand, needed many years to 
absorb the lessons it sought and it continued to lose 
market share. The balance in the alliance appeared to have 
favoured Toyota, (Lewis, 1990).
2.2.5 Maximising the Benefits of Partnering and
Alliances■
Management can guard against the risks of co-operation in 
two basic ways which are inextricably linked. The first 
concerns the basic structure of the relationship between 
the parties and the second concerns the actual management 
of the co-operative agreement. Bresser (1988) provides an 
interesting typology of the feasibility of various types of 
strategy combinations. This can be used by managers to 
match co-operative and competitive strategies. Assessments
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are made of both the risks of unintended information 
disclosure and also the possible gains as a result of co­
operation. Bresser, (1988), suggests that strategic 
alliances represent the greatest threat for unintended 
information disclosure whilst trade associations hold the 
least threat.
Ring and Van De Ven (1992) examine the structuring of co­
operative relations between competitors. Such relations 
between competitors require "...internal mechanisms 
designed to preserve the relationship and ensure that both 
the efficiency and the outcomes sought in the long term 
relationship are realised.", (Ring and Van De Ven, 1992, p. 
487). These mechanisms can be the formal or legal 
agreements between the parties for example, and therefore 
it is this agreement that determines what exactly the 
parties intend co-operating on and what they intend 
competing on. This provides a 'dividing line' between co­
operation and competition.
Internal mechanisms require safeguards and the object of 
these safeguards is to immunise the parties from the 
adverse consequences that could flow from unanticipated 
commercial or technological risks. Of critical importance 
in designing safeguards is an assessment of a number of 
criteria, these are risk and trust. Risk occurs due to 
uncertainty in time, information and control whilst trust 
refers to confidence in predictability, the elaborateness
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of safeguards is a function of the perceived risk and the 
reliance on trust by the parties, (Ring and Van De Ven,
1992) .
Partner selection is also a vital structural concern for 
establishing co-operative relations (Quinn and Hilmer, 
1994; Porter and Fuller, 1986, Lewis, 1990; Devlin and 
Bleakley, 1988; Lorange et al, 1992). The basic criteria 
for partner selection is to determine how the competitive 
position of the firm will be affected in the long term by 
co-operation.
Management must assess their ability to work with partners, 
for example, is there any personal chemistry between top 
management in the firms? Are their cultures and 
philosophies similar or divergent? As Kanter, (1994) notes 
"...what starts out as personal rapport, philosophical and 
strategic compatibility, and shared vision between two 
companies' top executives eventually must be 
institutionalised and made public.", (Kanter, 1994, p. 102)
Hamel and Prahalad (1989, p. 138) note "...most learning 
takes place at the lower levels of an alliance... they must 
be well briefed in the partner's strengths and weaknesses 
and understand how acquiring particular skills will bolster 
their company's particular skills". Therefore, employees 
as well as management need to be aware of the nature of co­
operation with competitors. This is important when firms 
wish to guard against the possible risks associated with
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the day to day running of an alliance and the risks 
associated with unintended information disclosure.
'Gatekeepers' have an important role in maintaining the 
balance between the benefits of co-operation on the one 
hand and the possible risks of unintended information 
disclosure on the other. 'Gatekeepers' are the people who 
control what information goes to a partner and they ensure 
that only essential knowledge is transferred, (Hamel et al,
1989). 'Gatekeepers' may occupy a separate collaboration 
section in the facility within which the alliance operates. 
The nature of the information is of course important. For 
example it is more difficult to assimilate knowledge on 
manufacturing excellence than it is to acquire technical 
information.
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2 . 3  Industry wide co-operation.
Introduction
As the forgoing review suggests co-operative strategies are 
receiving growing attention in the literature, though many 
issues remain to be resolved. However the subject of 
industry wide co-operation has received much less 
attention.
The current literature suggests that the main types of 
industry wide co-operation are industry associations, 
(Bresser, 1988; Bresser and Harl, 1986; Oliver, 1990) and 
collusion (Bresser, 1988). These forms are examined in 
detail in this section. For completeness, risks of 
industry wide co-operation and methods of reducing these 
risks are also discussed.
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2 . 3 . 1 Industry Associations
business-persons who come together in a formal organisation 
to cope with forces and demands to which they are similarly 
exposed." (Staber and Aldrich, 1983, p. 163) .
Industry associations provide member organisations with 
special services at low costs. For instance they may 
distribute trade statistics, analyze industry trends, 
provide credit references on customers, offer legal and 
technical advice, or help collect bills, (Bresser, 1988 ; 
Olson, 1965) . Industry associations can also negotiate 
discounts for members through group purchasing (Oliver,
1990). For example, the Service Stations Operators 
Association (SSOA), which represents Texaco franchisees in 
Ireland, has negotiated better terms for its members with 
wholesalers, credit card companies and banks, (Callan,
1993) .
Industry associations can be used to create a common 
marketing infrastructure, organise trade shows and fairs 
and conduct market research. Associations can also 
facilitate inter-member communication by publishing 
journals, newsletters and magazines (Oliver, 1990). Co­
operatives have been integral to the export success of 
Danish agricultural based industries, (Porter, 1990). In 
the Italian apparel, shoe, ceramic tile and furniture
An industry association is a "... [c]oalition of firms or
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industries, industry associations played a role in 
improving communications and logistical facilities, 
investigating process technology, and holding trade fairs, 
(Porter, 1990) .
In Japan, industry associations support and help develop 
linkages between buyers an suppliers by collecting and 
disseminating information and sponsoring research. 
Keiretsu in Japan are large groups of related companies, 
usually with a bank at the centre. They facilitate 
interchange among related companies who look to each other 
for guidance and input on new products, new processes and 
new businesses, (Porter, 1990).
Industry associations are also formed to conduct research, 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Research on consortia for 
instance suggests that organisations in an industry 
cooperate to pool and share the costs of research, 
(Browning et al, 1995), and to share technology, (Gibson 
and Rogers, 1994). For example, Sematech is a consortium 
of US semiconductor manufacturers which was formed to 
improve the industry infrastructure, the supplier base, the 
manufacturing processes and the management of the 
factories, (Browning et al, 1995)
By producing codes of ethics for members, industry 
associations promote a positive and legitimate industry 
image (Gupta and Lad, 1983; Oliver, 1990). Associations
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may also provide members with standard product definitions 
and quality guidelines. For example, the Irish Grain and 
Feed Association regularly conducts checks on the quality 
of members' seeds and grains. Without certification this 
produce cannot be sold.
Membership of an industry association can offer a more 
regular supply of finance to organisations and improve 
members relative bargaining power, (Litway and Hylton, 
1962; Oliver, 1990; Provan, 1983). For example, hospitals 
in the US have used industry associations such as the 
United Way to raise funds more effectively and efficiently, 
(D'Aunno and Zuckerman, 1987).
Finally, industry associations lobby government and public 
policy members, (Gupta and Lad, 1983; Oliver, 1990; Porter, 
1990; Staber and Aldrich, 1983). Industry associations 
promote the interests of their members, make members' 
viewpoints known to government , and lobby public policy 
makers to achieve favourable legislation.
2.3.2 Collusion and Industry Price Leadership.
The term "collusion" denotes express agreements open or 
secret that have the purpose of restricting competition in 
an industry, (Bresser, 1988). Most collusive agreements 
are outlawed however because they encourage monopolistic
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pricing behaviour. Nevertheless, collusive agreements do 
exist and are often effective forms of co-operation among 
organisations. Their attraction is associated with a high 
degree of informality which makes it difficult for 
outsiders to detect conspiratorial agreements, (Khandwalla, 
1981) .
Industry price leadership is a tacit version of collusion 
based on imitation. It describes a situation where a 
specific firm is the acknowledged leader in setting 
prices, and other firms follow. Unlike collusive
agreements, industry leadership has the advantage of not 
being contrary to antitrust laws. It is considered legal 
as long as it is grounded on voluntary imitation rather 
than explicit communication, (White, 1981).
2.3.3 Risks of Industry Wide Co-operation
Industry wide co-operation can provide a number of benefits 
for firms. However, it can also contain a number of 
adverse consequences. When firms in an industry cooperate 
they abstain from competition in certain areas (Pennings, 
1981; Bresser and Harl, 1986; Lewis, 1990) . Co-operation 
can effect the structure of industries, (Porter, 1980; 
Porter and Fuller, 1986). Industry structure refers to the 
rules of the game that firms play by. Rules of the game 
provide a degree of certainty and stability for companies
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competing in an industry. However, co-operation may 
provide the industry with too much stability, for example 
price fixing, which can have serious legal consequences, 
(Phillips, 1962; Scherer, 1980).
Excessive stability may also attract new entrants into the 
industry, (Caves, 1982) . Existing firms may not be able to 
mount a challenge to these new firms, and thus could go out 
of business.
One example of the risks associated with industry wide co­
operation comes from the banking industry in the US. In 
the 1970s US banks succeeded in using existing regulation 
to forestall competition by keeping regulated ceilings for 
interest rates on deposits artificially low to boost 
profits. However, these low rates attracted new entrants 
into the industry in the form of brokerage houses, like 
Merrill Lynch, offering money market funds at higher rates.
The banking industry could only respond to the challenge 
posed by these money market funds after federal restraints 
and regulations on short term deposit rates were removed. 
By the time this had occurred Merrill Lynch had become a 
significant market player, (Bresser and Harl, 1986).
Therefore, it is important to manage the balance between 
the benefits of co-operation and the possible dysfunctions 
(disadvantages). Bresser and Harl (1986) suggest that this
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process can be effectively managed in two ways. Managers 
can abandon the co-operative strategy altogether, thereby 
resuming competition. Any disadvantages resulting from co­
operation are therefore removed. Alternatively managers 
can 'mute' any of the unintended consequences of co­
operation by renegotiating, or improving, dysfunctional 
agreements.
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2.4 How are Co-operative Agreements Formed ?.
Introduction
This literature review has suggested that there are two 
basic forms of co-operation, firm level co-operation and 
industry level co-operation. Examples of these include 
strategic alliances, partnerships, trade associations and 
consortia. The benefits, risks and means of limiting these 
risks have also been discussed. The majority of studies on 
co-operative strategies to date have been primarily 
concerned with two issues, why do firms cooperate and what 
forms of co-operation exist.
This section reviews the current literature on formation 
processes for firm and industry level co-operation. In 
general, formation processes for co-operative strategies 
have received little attention in the literature to date. 
More specifically, there are only three studies which 
consider industry level co-operative formation processes. 
Of these, only one is an empirical study.
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2.4.1 Firm Level Co-operation.
The study of how co-operative relations between 
organisations form has only begun to receive any attention 
in the literature, (Smith et al, 1995). Research to date 
has focused on the conditions necessary for co-operation to 
occur, and the forms that this co-operation subsequently 
takes.
Studies have identified a number of elements that are 
important to the formation process for co-operative 
agreements between organisations. Trust must be fostered 
in a relationship (Browning et al, 1995; D'Aunno and 
Zuckerman, 1987; Ring and Van De Ven, 1992, 1994; Sherman, 
1992; Sheth and Paravatiyer, 1992; Tallman and Shenkar, 
1994). Trust decreases risk, (Ring and Van De Ven, 1992), 
however trust is not assumed, and it must be built up over 
time, (Axelrod, 1984), for example by making unilateral 
commitments, (Gulati et al, 1994) .
Other studies emphasize the important role of non-economic 
criteria when considering co-operative formation processes. 
Leadership has a key role to play, (Kanter, 1994; Ring and 
Van De Ven, 1994) . This can come in the form of key 
strategic actors, (Leavy, 1991), venture champions and role 
models, (Shortell and Zajac, 1988), leaders, (Browning et 
al, 19 95) and champions, (Tallman and Shenkar, 19 94) . 
Leadership can foster trust and innovation, (Browning et
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al, 1995) . It may also overcome many of the resistances to 
change that occur in organisations, (Kanter, 1984).
Another important feature of the co-operative strategy 
literature is that these processes are often complex, messy 
and unintended. The literature also suggests that informal 
processes are important, (D'Aunno and Zuckerman, 19 87; 
Kanter, 1994; Ring and Van De Ven, 1994) . For example, 
Haigh (1992) noted that the joint Ford and Mazda facility 
in Mexico was producing cars months before the formal 
agreement was signed by the parties. Other critical 
elements include the ability to resolve internal disputes, 
(Ring and Van De Ven, 1994).
A number of studies provide process models for the 
formation of alliances between companies. Bluestein (1994) 
describes four stages through which an alliance is formed: 
strategy development, partner assessment, contract 
negotiations and implementation. Lorange et al (1992) 
propose that the alliance formation process comprises two 
stages, an initial phase and an intensive phase. The 
initial phase deals with assessing the match between the 
partners and the broad benefits to each from co-operating. 
The second more intensive phase is concerned with such 
issues as the strategic position of the venture vis a vis 
competitors and the drafting of a strategic plan. These 
studies however concentrate on stages and they fall short 
of providing an insight as to how the venture might proceed
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from one stage to another.
Some studies in the literature provide a comprehensive 
insight into how co-operation forms between organisations 
which feature both the critical elements and the stages or 
the phases highlighted above. These studies are concerned 
with the developmental processes associated with the 
formation of alliances, (Lorange et al, 1992; Ring and Van 
De Ven, 1994; Shortell and Zajac, 1988), and buyer-supplier 
relationships, (Dwyer, Schurr and Sejo (1987) .
These studies suggest that joint ventures go through a 
number of stages of development and that the progression 
from one stage to the next is guided by a number of 
heuristics. Ring and Van De Ven (1994) suggest that co­
operative inter-organisational relations emerge, develop 
and dissolve over time and that the progression from one 
stage is facilitated by "... [t]he repetitive sequence of 
negotiation, commitment and execution each one of which is 
assessed in terms of efficiency and equity, (Ring and Van 
De Ven, 1994, pp. 96-97) . Social process such as prior 
social ties, institutionalisation and attachment are also 
important.
Similarly, Dwyer, Schurr and Sejo (1987) in examining 
buyer-supplier relations list five relationship development 
processes or stages. These are: awareness, exploration,
expansion, commitment and dissolution. These are also
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guided by what the authors term "sub-processes" such as 
attraction, communication and bargaining, power and 
justice, and norm development.
Shortell and Zajac (1988) consider the development of 
Internal Corporate Joint Ventures (ICJV's) and propose a 
three stage iterative model of formulation, implementation 
and reformulation. Unlike the previous two studies the 
authors do not examine decision making processes that guide 
the model but consider the effects of the environment, 
organisational context, and process factors that affect the 
performance of ICJV's. Environmental factors examine how 
supportive the environment is, for example, the level of 
competition. Organisational context factors examine the 
level of internal supportiveness, for example, the amount 
of prior experience of co-operating and the level of 
resistance. Finally, process factors are concerned with 
strategic integration, processual concerns, operational 
autonomy and performance related reward systems.
2.4.2 Industry Wide Co-operation.
Fewer studies have concentrated on the developmental 
processes associated with co-operation developing in an 
industry as a whole. The literature reveals three such 
studies: Dollinger (1990) in a fragmented industry setting, 
Browning, Beyer and Shetler (1995) in the more concentrated
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semiconductor industry in the US, and D'Aunno and 
Zuckerman, (1987) for hospital federations. The Browning, 
Beyer and Shetler (1995) study is the only empirical work.
(i) Browning. Bever and Shetler. (1995).
This study examines how co-operation can emerge in a 
competitive setting. To achieve this the US semiconductor 
industry was empirically examined. Sematech is a research 
consortium that eventually represented 75% of the industry. 
Sematech was established to improve the industry 
infrastructure, the supplier base, the manufacturing 
processes and the management of the factories. It was also 
concerned with improving the quality of the semiconductors 
and in particular the size of the circuits on the chips. 
All this was done in the face of intensifying competition 
from Japanese companies. The project received full US 
Government support.
The study proposes that the process by which co-operation 
forms in a competitive industry can be explained by 
complexity theory. Complexity theory posits that "the self 
organising of complex ordered systems from apparent chaos 
does happen, all the time, all around, even when it is 
misunderstood, unappreciated or unwanted", (Browning et al, 
1995, pp. 139).
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Firstly, for co-operation to emerge a bifurcation point 
must be reached. This is a period of disequilibrium that 
ushers a break with the past. Participants "de-commit" 
themselves from existing processes and values. It is at 
this point that some may consider radical new ideas, for 
example co-operation, as viable strategic alternatives, 
Axelrod (1984) refers to this as the shadow of the future.
Co-operation spreads as a result of the milieu of micro 
level social interactions that occur between individuals as 
constituents of organisations as they search for the best 
practices inside and outside the industry. They are not 
necessarily as the result of the underlying economic logic 
to cooperate. They involve a certain degree of bounded 
rationality, learning, imitation and a willingness to 
contribute this to a co-operative effort. This culminates 
in what is called a moral community. Non-directive 
leadership style is important for these self organising 
processes and leaders are not advised to get involved with 
practical affairs as it can "tarnish their charisma", 
(Browning et al , 1995, pp. 141).
Resulting from these self-organising processes a new order 
can emerge which is more complex than the previous 
situation of chaos. To achieve this, the system must 
remain open to change and this new order may have a number 
of unintended consequences. For this new order to gain 
acceptance inputs of new energy are required, particularly
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in the form of leadership, these are called 'cultural 
leaders'. Complexity theory does not account for the 
sources of these.
Therefore, complexity theory helps to explain how small 
discrete events can have large consequences. Individual 
contributions can become self amplifying because they can 
give birth to a 'moral community' and can subsequently 
create structures that in turn create other structures (new 
order) . It also highlights the importance of an initial 
crisis or chaos that makes a break with the past and 
stimulates an openness to radical new ideas.
(ii) D'Aunno and Zuckerman, (1987).
This study develops a life-cycle model for hospital 
federations which is based on life-cycle models for 
individual firms. This model has four stages and progress 
through each of these stages is guided by management 
completing one or more key tasks during each stage. These 
four stages are:
(a) Emergence of a Coalition.
A coalition of hospitals emerges prior to the formation of 
a federation. This coalition can be formed usually because 
hospitals are facing some sort of threat to their
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existence. A typical example of this would be a government 
proposal to reduce health care funding to hospitals. 
Hospital management form a coalition with the broad aim of 
lobbying politicians to influence voting on this proposal.
Key tasks for hospital management at this phase are to 
define the exact purpose of the coalition and also to 
develop a membership criteria. Membership is usually based 
on similar ideologies, or type of community they serve. 
For instance, a coalition of 40 university hospitals has 
been formed in the US.
(b) Transition to a Federation
In this stage the key issues include sustaining and 
increasing member commitment to achieving the goals of the 
federation and increasing members' dependence on the 
federation for valued resources. Management can experience 
problems in sustaining member's commitment to the 
federation and detractors can emerge. This lack of 
commitment usually results from individual hospitals' 
reluctance to grant authority to executive committees and 
management groups. Achieving financial support from 
members can also be a problem.
One of the key tasks for management at this stage is to 
hire or form a management group. One of the principal 
reasons for this is that managing a federation is a time
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consuming process and many hospital managers do not have
the time to do this along with managing their own
hospitals. The other task for management is to establish 
formal mechanisms for coordination and control. This
provides effective management of fund raising, budgetary 
control and it helps to build trust between members.
(c) Maturity of a Federation.
This stage is dependent on a number of factors. There is 
a need for continued and increased investment of resources 
by members and a willingness of members to put the 
interests of the federation first. During this phase the 
federation cannot meet all of the requirements of the
members simultaneously hence the need for members to put 
others' needs first.
The key tasks for management at this stage are to meet the 
stated objectives of the federation and to assure members 
that their concerns will be addressed as equitably as 
possible in the long run.
(d) Critical Crossroads.
In this final stage, there is increased centralisation and 
dependence on the federation which motivates members to 
either withdraw from the federation or move towards merger 
or common ownership. Members may wish to withdraw because
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membership may have reduced their autonomy and heightened 
their dependence on a single actor. On the other hand, 
members may believe that the benefits outweigh the costs 
and they may wish to amalgamate further.
A central factor influencing movement in either direction 
is likely to be the ability of the management group to 
identify and resolve issues concerning control in the 
federation and the autonomy of the individual members. 
This is difficult because the influence of the management 
group itself may be in question.
(iii) Dollinger, (1990).
The final study on how co-operation emerges in an industry 
concerns fragmented industries. Fragmented industries are 
industries in which no firm has an overall dominant 
position (Porter, 1980). Mutual interdependence is a 
necessary prerequisite for co-operation. However firms in 
fragmented industries have a problem recognising this 
mutual interdependence due to their relative size and the 
number of other firms in the industry. Dollinger (1990) 
argues that co-operative strategies are no less salient in 
fragmented industries. These strategies are emergent
strategies, i.e. they manifest themselves as patterns or 
consistencies in firm behaviour (strategies) in the absence 
of intentions. Therefore, according to the study,
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overarching co-operative strategies in fragmented 
industries emerge unintendedly over time.
Dollinger (1990) draws heavily on the earlier work of 
Axelrod (1984) in explaining the evolution of these 
'emergent collective strategies'. There are early stages 
of development and this comes in the form of earlier pair­
wise co-operative behaviour between smaller numbers of 
firms. Co-operation spreads throughout the whole industry 
unintendedly, until all or most of the companies in the 
industry appear to be co-operating. The mechanisms by 
which this collective strategy can spread through the 
industry are; imitation, learning, direct contact between 
firms in the industry, and firms acting in a similar manner 
due to the effects of competition. The process focuses on 
the micro level changes that aggregate into macro level 
phenomenon.
If a sufficient number of companies in an industry adopt 
the same strategy, a critical mass is reached when the 
strategy becomes recognised as a discernable feature of the 
industry. At this point the emergent collective can become 
self conscious and develop into a full blown collective 
strategy, it can decay, or it can remain emergent strategy. 
Therefore, in fragmented industries co-operation does not 
emerge as a full blown, recognisable, co-operative 
strategy. It has earlier more subtle stages of
development.
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2 . 5 Theoretical Framework
The co-operative strategy literature is extensive. 
However, it is underdeveloped in a number of respects as 
the literature review has illustrated. Little research has 
been done on the processes by which co-operative strategies 
form, especially in the case of industry wide co-operation. 
Furthermore, little if any attention has been given to the 
process of informal co-operation to date. Both of these 
areas are addressed in the current study.
Because relatively little is known about the processes of 
interest, the research in this dissertation is exploratory 
and descriptive in nature. The overall approach is case 
based, and the research design is built around three major 
and a number of minor cases.
A suitable conceptual framework was required to provide 
guidelines for conducting research on industry level co­
operation and in particular its formation processes. Prior 
to choosing a suitable framework, research objectives and 
a number of research questions were determined.
Introduction.
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2.5.1 Research Objectives.
The objective of this research is to discover more about 
industry level co-operation and in particular the processes 
by which it forms in a variety of settings. The type of 
questions that this research hopes to answer are:-
• Are there different types of processes or are there 
similarities across formation processes ?, for 
example, are there phases of co-operation as the 
literature suggests ?
• What are the driving forces of formation processes, 
are they social, economic or behavioral ?
• Do the rationale for of industry level co-operation 
change over time for any reason ?
• Are there any other different types of industry level 
co-operation other than those mentioned in the 
literature review ?
• Is the overall formation process deliberate or 
emergent ?
The research needed a theoretical framework which could 
answer these and similar questions. More specifically, the
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research required a theoretical framework
• That considers the context within which co-operation 
emerges. The current literature suggests that 
environmental context is a key determinant of co­
operation .
• Allows for patterns of continuity and change to be 
observed over time.
• That can take account of social as well as economic 
factors. For instance, the role of leadership is a 
re-occurring theme in the literature.
• Finally, the framework needed to be theoretically 
sound whilst allowing for flexibility in research 
design on the part of the researcher.
2.5.2 The Pettigrew Context Process Outcome Framework.
The Pettigrew (1985) contextualist framework is a 
conceptually sound, and empirically useful framework for 
the study of industry level co-operation and in particular 
its formation processes. This framework considers the 
content of a chosen strategy, the management of the process 
of change and the contexts in which it occurs.
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OUTER
CONTEXT
OUTCOME
Two aspects of context are considered: the inner and outer 
contexts of the firm. Inner context refers to the to the 
structure , corporate culture and the political contexts 
within the firm through which ideas for change have to 
proceed. Outer context refers to the economic, business 
and political and societal formations in which firms must 
operate. The process of change refers to the actions,
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reactions and interactions form the various interested 
parties as they seek to move the firm from its present to 
its future state. Process are both constrained by contexts 
and shape contexts. Therefore the 'what' of change is 
encapsulated under the label content, much of the 'why' of 
change is derived from an analysis of inner and outer 
context, and the 'how' of change can be understood from an
analysis of process, (Pettigrew, 1987).
The framework is flexible because it relies on broad 
organising principals rather than a tightly specified 
research method. It provides direction for research on the 
strategy process whilst allowing originality on the part 
of the researcher on the specifics of research design, 
(Leavy, 1992). The framework offers analytical structure 
at a broad level but no over restrictive theoretical web. 
There is plenty of space to adjust research designs and 
study questions as one moves to one content area of change 
to another, (Pettigrew, 1987).
Theoretical and practically useful research on strategic 
change should involve the continuous interplay among ideas 
about the context, process, and content of change
(Pettigrew, 1990). By using longitudinal case based
research strategies, the Pettigrew meta-framework allows 
for patterns of continuity and change in industries to be 
observed over time.
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Other researchers have successfully used contextualist 
research. Whipp et al (1989a) have used this framework to 
empirically examine the link between corporate culture and 
competitiveness in two mature UK businesses, automobiles 
and merchant banking. Arthur and Hendry (1990) have used 
a similar process model to link human resource management 
and the emergent strategy of small to medium sized business 
units. Dofour (1990) has used the framework to empirically 
examine the strategy implementation process through his 
comparative study of the closure of maternity units across 
a number of regions of the British Health Service. Leavy 
(1991) has used this framework to empirically examine the 
amalgamation episode of the Irish dairy sector between 1958 
and 1974. Finally, Hardy (1990) has applied this framework 
to the empirical examination of retrenchment processes in 
Canadian universities.
In summary, this approach is based along a number of broad 
organising principles rather than a tightly specified 
research method. These principles can be summarised as 
follows:-
Multiple levels of analysis are involved in 
connecting context, process and outcome using 
economic, political and cultural modes of 
analysis.
An underlying theory of social action is posited
(i)
(ii)
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which is neither over-voluntarist or over- 
determinist in world view.
(iii) It is based on longitudinal case based research
strategies that allow patterns of continuity and 
change to be observed over time.
(Leavy, 1992, p. 23) 
These principles make this framework suitable for 
investigating formation processes for industry level co­
operation. It considers the wider context with which co­
operation may form in an industry, through social, 
political and cultural modes of analysis. Contexts can 
change over time and are subject to interpretation and this 
framework allows for the interaction between contexts and 
outcomes in a non-linear way, (Leavy, 1994).
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2.6 The Research Methodology.
The preferred research methodology is primarily inductive 
and case based. This methodology is particularly suited to 
the examination of processes, and seemed most appropriate 
in exploring the question of how co-operative strategies 
from and change in a variety of industries.
Many researchers have used induction to research process 
issues in strategic management in the recent years, 
(Browning et al, 1995; Leavy, 19 91; Minzberg, 1978, 1979;
Pettigrew, 1985) . Researchers have found that inductive 
methodologies have been successful for uncovering the
processes that drive strategic change in organisations, 
(Burglemen, 1983; Kanter, 1983; Pettigrew, 1985; Quinn, 
1980).
A case study method best suits the research topic, the
contextualist mode of analysis and the broad research
objectives. The case study approach has become a
" [r] esearch strategy" , (Yin, 1981, p. 59), that allows the 
researcher to compare data across cases and to present the 
"[c]hain of evidence", (Yin, 1981, p. 63).
Inductive case based research has been criticised as 
unscientific due to the absence of elegant procedures, 
(Miles, 1979). More recently, however, it has become a 
legitimate research tool. Researchers have used this
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approach in the competitive strategy literature, (Porter, 
1980, 1985, 1987, 1990), the strategic change literature , 
(Pettigrew, 1985; Leavy, 1992; Whipp et al, 1987) and also 
the co-operative strategy literature, (Browning et al, 
1995; Hamel and Prahalad, 1989).
Inductive research was also the personal preference of the 
researcher. Personal preferences have influenced others' 
decisions to adopt case based research. As Henry Minzberg 
comments, "it is discovery that attracts me to this 
business..." , (1979, p. 584). Other researchers such as
Pettigrew also admit to using this a research strategy out 
of personal preference.
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2.7 The Research Process
Case based research can be iterative and untidy, (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967; Pettigrew, 1987). It is a craft process 
and not just a technical task. However the research 
process for this work can be summarised in a number of 
sections.
2.7.1 Selecting the Cases
Selecting case sites was one of the most demanding episodes 
during the research process. Industry wide co-operation is 
ubiquitous and can difficult to detect unlike other forms 
of co-operation such as partnerships and alliances. 
Therefore one of the first tasks of the researcher was to 
identify examples of industry wide co-operation. This was 
achieved in a number of ways. The Administration Yearbook 
Diary published annually by the Institute of Public
Administration (Dublin) provides a comprehensive directory 
of trade and industry associations, their functions and 
also contact names in those organisations. The Annual 
Report of the Registrar of Friendly Societies published by 
The Stationery Office (Dublin) contains additional
information on trade an industry associations.
However one of the objectives of the research was to
identify other possible forms of industry wide co­
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operation, ie sources other than industry associations. 
This was achieved by consulting a wide range of industry 
and other trade journals, newspaper cuttings, data bases, 
in an attempt to yield such information. It was through 
this method that the contract mouldmakers case was 
identified.
Another very important method of identifying possible case 
sites was to use an personal business contacts of 
researcher. This involved building a network of contacts 
in a variety of businesses in an unplanned, high risk 
approach. This produced interesting forms of industry co­
operation which would have been impossible to identify by 
other means, the homogenous products producers industry and 
also the various cases of informal co-operation.
Once possible case sites had been identified it was 
important to select the most relevant cases to the research 
objectives. Data was needed to allow for the examination 
of process. Case sites needed to be accessible and this
suggested that they should be located in Ireland. For 
completeness a starting point and where possible a 
finishing point also needed to be evident.
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2 . 7 . 2 Gaining and maintaining site access
Case based research requires a high degree of direct access 
to organisational personnel and archival material. It can 
be the most intrusive form of data collection requiring a 
high degree of commitment on the part of organisations. 
This research had co-operation in industries as its focus. 
Once initial screening had taken place companies in these 
industries were approached. Initial approaches were 
informal and middle management were approached and 
interviewed to uncover patterns of potential interest.
Following this, more formal approaches were made to top 
management, usually the managing director. By this time 
the researcher had some knowledge of the key themes of the 
research.
However, one notable feature of this research is that is 
was probably less intrusive than other case based research. 
This is because multiple organisations were examined in the 
preparation of case narratives. No one single organisation 
was examined in great detail. The objective was to gain an 
understanding of the change processes that happened in the 
industries as well as the firms under consideration.
The benefits of this were that negotiating access to sites 
was a more straight forward process and usually, although 
not always, one interview sufficed. Maintaining access was
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not as critical an issue for this research as it would be 
for other studies that focus on single sites for example.
The first interview was usually the easiest to secure. 
This may be attributed to a certain level of curiosity on 
the part of the interviewee. Securing second and 
subsequent interviews with busy executives was a time- 
consuming and frustrating process that required diplomacy 
and often luck. The only advice that this researcher can 
give on the later point is to impress upon interviewees at 
the first interview that case based research is an 
iterative process and that continuing support from the 
interviewee would be appreciated.
2.7.3 Collecting Data
Data collection consisted of an initial phase and a more 
intensive phase. The initial phase consisted of a pilot 
study to uncover patterns of potential interest and to 
identify the variations in industry types most likely to 
fruitful analysis. The more intensive phase examined those 
patterns in greater detail.
The principal data collection method was personal 
interview. The researcher conducted over forty semi- 
structures personal interviews with middle management and 
top executives of companies and associations. Some
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questions prior to the interview. Other interviewees 
objected to the use of tape recorders. The interview
process was demanding, time consuming and required
considerable social skills. One interview, for instance,
was held on a factory floor because the researcher detected 
that the interviewee was becoming bored sitting in an 
office. This inhibited fruitful discussion. The 
researcher suggested that the factory floor would be a more 
relaxed environment within which an interview may be 
conducted.
Additional data sources included archival material such as 
press cuttings and internal company reports. In total over 
100 additional documents were consulted. The first data 
sources that were consulted were press cuttings and 
industry and sectoral reports. Following this personal 
interviews took place in an attempt to provide further 
insight into the processes behind events. From this, new 
lines of enquiry developed, and the whole process resembled 
detective work, (Minzberg, 1979).
2.7.4 Data Analysis
Case based research can generate a vast amount of data and 
it is essential that the researcher knows this data 
intimately. Data may contain minute details that only
interviewees asked to see a transcript of possible
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become relevant at some later time and even the most 
elaborate data organisation techniques may not be 
sufficient to access data on demand. Research notes, tape 
recordings etc. needed to be constantly re-examined by the 
researcher to gain intimacy with the data.
Separate files were opened on each case which contained all 
the relevant industry data, press cuttings, internal 
company documents, interview notes and any draft copies of 
the actual written case study. A journal or notebook for 
research memoranda was maintained, (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967; Mills, 1970) which contained all ideas or suggestions 
concerning the research and in particular any conclusions 
that might be further developed. These files were re-read 
both separately and in conjunction with other files to 
attempt to build an in depth knowledge of each case.
Internal discussion of this data with my supervisor, 
colleagues, friends and family provided the so-called 
"creative leap" from which a complete "in-depth" case study 
could emerge. Therefore the process of analysis was 
interactive. Literature review, data collection and 
analysis were not done in strictly linear sequence. They 
were interleaved as the project progressed and the 
researcher interacted with the data.
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2.7.5 Confidentiality
An important task of the case based researcher is to 
preserve the anonymity of data sources when requested to do 
so, (Pettigrew, 1987). Maintaining the confidentiality of 
sources was a principal concern in this research. The 
three principal data sources in the homogenous products 
producers industry requested that their identity and the 
identity of the industry remain confidential, for obvious 
legal reasons. Another key source in the mouldmaking 
industry also asked to remain anonymous. Disclosing the 
identity of this source may affect his position within an 
industry association. The promise of confidentiality was 
rewarded by unique access to rich data sources.
2.7.6 Case Writing
The data is presented in a number of three major and a 
number of minor case narratives. Writing case narratives 
began early in the research. This was done to in an 
attempt to develop themes. It was only through this 
process of narrative writing early in the process that 
central themes eventually began to emerge late in the 
process.
During the preparation of the narratives care was taken not 
only to be factually correct, but also to ensure that the
7 0
data was presented in a form that would be interesting and 
easy to read. Initial drafts of the cases were cold, 
factual and had underdeveloped themes. As additional data 
were collected, narrative became more embellished and 
yielded more developed themes.
Through the repetitive process of writing, recording 
research memoranda, consultation, data collection and the 
inspirational component or creative leap three major and a 
number of minor case narratives were completed. The 
narratives were descriptive in nature in order to allow the 
reader as much access to the data as possible, unhindered 
by too much premature interpretation. By presenting the 
data in major and minor case narratives this research hopes 
to give adequate attention to both the depth and scope of 
industry wide co-operation.
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2.8 Conclusions
The literature on co-operative strategy is extensive. 
However there are many unresolved issues. Further research 
is needed to determine if the process to industry wide co­
operation is deliberate or emergent. Are there any 
patterns of formation across different industries, 
including fragmented industries ? Are there any other 
formal or even informal types of co-operation ? What 
effects do social, political and cultural criteria have on 
formation processes ? What, if any, are the unintended 
consequences of industry-wide co-operation ?
Future research on these issues should be exploratory in 
nature. A suitable framework for examining some of these 
issues is the Pettigrew (1985) contextualist framework. 
This framework is suitable because it allows for patterns 
of continuity and change to be observed over time. It uses 
longitudinal case-based research methodologies. It is 
flexible as to the research design and it allows for 
multiple modes of analysis. In chapter three the data is 
presented in a number of major and minor case narratives 
which are presented using this contextualist framework.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE DATA
73
Introduction
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first 
there are three major case narratives. These are the 
potato industry, the contract mouldmakers' industry and a 
homogenous products producers' industry. The case
narratives are descriptive. This ensures that the reader 
has much access to the data as possible, unhindered by too 
much premature interpretation. The case narratives are 
organised using the context-process-outcome framework
outlined in chapter two. Context examines 'why' co­
operation formed in each of the industries. Process
examines 'how' co-operation formed. Finally, content 
considers 'what' was the result or outcome of these
processes.
The pilot study, which was discussed in chapter one,
illustrated another form of industry-wide co-operation, 
informal co-operation among individuals. For
completeness, although not of primary focus in the final 
study, a number of minor cases are included in section two 
in order to provide some examination of this important 
phenomenon.
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3.1 The Major Cases.
Industries.
(i) Industry Background
The potato industry in Ireland has seen a number of changes 
in the last few years. The industry can be divided into a 
number of sectors which interact and provide the basis for 
understanding the reasons for these changes in the 
industry.
Growers
In 1992 the potato industry in Ireland was worth an 
estimated £ 54 million. It employed approximately 100,000 
people both indirectly and directly and 14,000 hectares of 
land were used in potato production, (An Bord Glas, 1992) . 
In 1970 there were 156,000 producers (Central Statistics 
Office, 1992) . However by 1992 this had decreased to
17,000 producers. Of these, 1756 farmed in excess of two 
hectares, 700 farmed between two and five hectares and only 
400 farmed between five and ten hectares, (An Bord Glas,
1992) . These figures are small in comparison to Dutch 
potato farmers where a total of 15,000 potato farmers 
10,200 farmed 10 hectares or more, (Caulfield, 1989) .
3 . 1 . 1  The Irish Potato Merchants' and Potato Growers'
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Traditionally growers sold to their local market. To a 
certain extent this still occurs. However the dominance of 
the local market as an outlet is on the decline. The market 
for potatoes is very unstable. Prices fluctuate
considerably from year to year. This is due to a number of 
reasons. Storage facilities in the industry are poor. 
This often leads to shortages of supply towards the end of 
the season, usually the second quarter of the year from 
April to June. As a result of these shortages prices have 
historically tended to increase and imports to appear. On 
the other hand, at harvest time there was typically an 
oversupply of potatoes onto the market. Growers were 
unable to keep these for long periods and this forced them 
to accept lower prices. Poor storage facilities also 
affected prices by decreasing the quality of potatoes 
through frost damage, sprouting and also loss of water. 
Prices are also affected because Irish growers' yields are 
low by international standards, this increases costs. 
There are a number of reasons for this bad seed, poor 
storage, disease, poor soil and handling damage, (Glennon, 
1993) .
Another reason for the unstable nature of the market was 
that growers could be enticed into the industry by the lure 
of the previous years' prices, if high. Such high prices 
however could have been caused by a number of factors, such 
as poor weather which diminishes the yield, and results in 
under-supply. Therefore the nature of the market was
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speculative and growers possessed little or no market 
information.
A large number of suppliers in a fragmented industry with 
little or no market power, ensured buyers had the balance 
of power in the business. There was traditionally little 
evidence of producer groups. These were only officially 
possible after 1990 following a change in EU regulation 
(Caulfield, 1989). However, up to ten loosely formed 
producers groups existed in various growing areas of 
Ireland the largest being the North Leinster Growers Group, 
(Caulfield, 1989) . These groups only came to life in times 
of crisis ie poor marketing returns. They varied in nature 
from being pressure groups to developing common marketing, 
storage, packaging and grading activities. By 1992 only 
four officially recognised producer groups existed in the 
industry representing 56 producers and 1,400 hectares of 
land.
This situation is in stark contrast to the situation that 
existed in Holland, for instance, where producers are 
highly organised. In Holland 80% of production is 
accounted for by 10,200 growers of ten hectares or more, 
(Caulfield, 1989) . The average Dutch farmer is a member of 
three or four co-operatives which individually deal with 
supply of inputs, production credit, marketing etc. These 
co-operative are themselves nationally organised at the 
sectoral and general levels.
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In Ireland, co-operation was non-existent at national level 
although at local level growers informally cooperated at 
harvest times by sharing machinery, for instance. The 
market was easy to enter and exit and the prices for 
produce were dictated by dominant buyers. They took 
advantage of the fluctuations in supply that the growers 
experienced and their lack of market information.
Merchants
Merchants have always existed to a certain extent in the 
business. Traditionally, merchants bought produce from the 
growers and sold it on to some of the larger customers 
supermarkets for instance. Merchants did not add value, 
they neither washed or pre-packed potatoes and they were 
regarded as 'handlers'.
Traditionally there were less merchants than growers. Some 
estimates suggested that there were approximately 25 in the 
country, (Caulfield, 1989). The merchants segment of the 
industry displayed similar chaos to that of the growers. 
It was price sensitive and unorganised to any great extent. 
Some merchants were members of a trade association, the 
Potato Federation. However, they used their membership to 
spread false information about the market to other 
competitors.
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Like the growers' segment of the market, the merchants' 
segment was traditionally easy to enter and exit. This 
presented some problems for the industry. In 1989 it was 
estimated that nearly 2 0% of the output of the industry 
(80,0 00 tonnes) was handled by truckers, lorry-men or semi- 
merchants. They operated from lorries buying and selling 
potatoes, (Caulfield, 1989). They moved freely within the 
system loading their lorries as cheaply as possible, after 
pitting grower against grower. They had no overheads, 
stores, washing facilities etc. yet their prices for 
potatoes often became the basis for prices on the wholesale 
market.
Most merchants did not possess long term storage
facilities. By 1989 an estimated 11 of the 25 merchants
who supplied the Dublin market had storage facilities, 
(Caulfield, 1989). The total capacity of these facilities 
was 4,200 tonnes representing approximately two weeks 
supply. This also affected the supply, quality and price 
instability problems in the industry.
The Market
The quality of the Irish potato was traditionally regarded 
as being poor. During the months of April and May 1983 An
Foras Talunas (The Agricultural Research Institute)
conducted a potato marketing survey. In the course of the
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interviews over 900 people were asked if they were 
satisfied with their purchases of Irish potatoes. Fifty 
percent claimed that they were satisfied, 37 % were not 
satisfied and 13 % had mixed views. Therefore 50 % of
Irish people were either not satisfied, or did not know if 
they liked the quality of the Irish potato. The potato had 
a dirty image compared with the other products according to 
Mr. Liam Glennon of Sam Dennigan and company (potato 
merchants). The potato occupied a dirty corner of the 
Supermarket away from all the other fruit and vegetables.
There have been a number of changes in the tastes of 
consumers in the last twenty years. This has lead to the 
introduction of a number of different basic foods onto the 
Irish market. There has been a growth in the popularity of 
commodities such as pasta, rice and pizzas. In 1991 for 
instance, £ 12.1 million was spent on rice and pasta (not 
including sauces) and a further £ 10 million was spent on 
pizzas. The average growth rate per capita for consumption 
of pasta is 9%. By contrast, the consumption of the potato 
has remained static, (National Food Centre, 1992) . Ten 
years ago the sales levels of the above was negligible. 
However, the potato is now in the food business and not 
just the potato business.
Another major development has been the growing dominance of 
supermarket chains in the country in recent years. It is 
estimated that supermarkets account for over 50 % of all of
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the sales of potatoes in Ireland every year (Checkout,
1993) . The dominance of the supermarkets has caused 
further erosion of market power from the growers. 
Supermarkets prefer to deal with larger suppliers, such as 
merchants. Another important feature of the growth of the 
supermarkets is that there has been a growing emphasis on 
the supply of high quality potatoes.
Finally, in the last few years there has been an increased 
threat of new entrants in to the Irish market, in the form 
of foreign imports. Regulatory change in 1979 made 
importing potatoes possible. The first imported potatoes 
appeared in shops in 1982. Since then foreign imports have 
a major feature of the Irish market. The majority of 
imports occur during the second quarter of the year from 
April to June. This situation is exacerbated by limited 
storage capacity in the industry and the relatively poor 
condition of the Irish potato.
(ii) How did co-operation arise in the industry ?
Industry Chancre since 1911.
In 1977 the Irish government introduced a national quality 
standard for ware potatoes under the Food Standards 
(Potatoes) Regulations. This standard made it illegal for 
anyone to sell potatoes which did not meet certain
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criteria. Under these regulations it became illegal to 
sell potatoes with more that 5 % damage, 2 % rots, 3 %
sizing defects and 3 % mixed varieties. All prepacked
should be graded 4 0 - 60 mm or 60 - 8 0 mm. These standards 
were introduced in preparation for the lifting of trade 
barriers which would allow foreign imports to enter Ireland 
for the first time.
As has already been noted, in 1979 trade barriers were 
lifted for potatoes and other agricultural produce as a 
consequence of Ireland joining the EEC (EU). The lifting 
of trade barriers had little effect initially. In 1979 
2,960 tonnes of potatoes worth £ 441,000 were imported. By 
1980 the figure had increased to 19,464, tonnes worth £ 2.7 
million, (Central Statistics Office, 1983, p. 13.1). It 
was not until 1982 that the imports began to have a 
significant impact on the Irish market. In 1982 Irish 
producers experienced a bad summer. Subsequently imports 
of potatoes, mainly from Holland, increased to 84,000 
tonnes, worth £ 13.3 million.
By importing potatoes, merchants and supermarkets were 
guaranteed a more regular supply. However imported 
potatoes tasted different from the traditional Irish 
potato. Dutch imports were not as dry as their Irish 
competitors. They had a higher water content. The An 
Foras Talunais survey in 1983 suggested that consumers had 
little loyalty to the Irish potato, and they rapidly
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changed to the Dutch imports.
Initial Reaction: 1983-1987
Initial reaction to these imports was negative. Growers 
demanded a boycott of the imports. Some even resorted to 
high-jacking imported potatoes and pouring diesel over them 
to render them useless for sale. The mid 1980s saw many 
events such as these particularly between 1983 and 1987. 
During this period other imported potatoes began to appear 
in particular Italian, Spanish, Cypriot and Greek. These 
were also of a more consistent quality all the year round. 
The Irish consumer for the first time in centuries did not 
have to wait for the "new potato".
The other key feature of the imports were that they were 
cleaner. They were also packaged in smaller more 
convenient bags. Irish potatoes were still being sold un­
washed and in large 25 kilo. bags. Therefore, supermarkets 
preferred to buy imports. The year round superior quality, 
and the convenient packaging were decisive factors.
During this period producers began to put pressure on the 
Irish Farmers Association, in particular the National 
Potato Committee. The IFA responded by putting political 
pressure on the government to introduce a number of 
measures to alleviate the problem for growers. Initial
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suggestions included a proposal to introduce quotas in 
1987. This was objected to on the basis that it would be 
too difficult to administer and also it would be in 
contravention of EU regulations.
The other main suggestions were to provide grant aid to the 
industry to build of storage facilities. This would help 
to stabilise supply. At this time it was estimated that of 
the twenty five large merchants in the Dublin area, only 
eleven had adequate storage facilities totalling 4,200 
tonnes. This represented two weeks supply. In the country 
as a whole there was an estimated 32,000 tonnes of long 
term storage facilities representing only 7% of national 
output, (Caulfield, 1989).
An Bord Glas and the National Potato Coordinator
The Irish Government responded by creating An Bord Glas 
(ABG) in October 1987 as a non-statutory, semi-state body. 
It did not receive official sanction for the recruitment of 
staff, acquiring of premises and the establishment of the 
statutory board until 1990. During the 1987-1990 period an 
interim board was put into place. The objectives of the 
interim Bord were vague at the beginning. It was to be a 
horticultural development board. Its first task was to 
initiate two development plans for the industry. These 
were aimed at a combined market share recovery, an export
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expansion of £ 60 million and the creation of 1800 full 
time jobs and 1,50 0 part time jobs, (An Bord Glas, 19 91) .
Between 1987 and 1989, during the drafting of the 
development plans for ABG, executives from ABG and the IFA 
began to discuss the establishment of a National potato 
Coordinator (NPC) . The role of the NPC would be to provide 
greater transparency in the market. This could be achieved 
by monitoring the levels of supply and demand to prevent 
oversupply, for example. In 198 9 the IFA advertised for 
applicants for this post in the national press. Forty two 
applications were received and from these Mr. Jim Thornton 
was appointed in May 1990.
Thornton was an inspector for the department of agriculture 
for twenty-five years. He was chosen for his in-depth 
knowledge of the industry and his direct, tough approach to 
management. The IFA and ABG believed that such an approach 
would be necessary to organise the potato growers. His 
salary of £ 20,000 is funded by the IFA and ABG and a 
voluntary contribution from the growers of £ 3 each per 
annum. The initial contract was for three years. This has 
been extended to 19 99.
The appointment of Thornton was significant, because it 
created a new awareness for the potato industry in Ireland. 
One of the most crucial aspects of the business that needed 
attention was the issue of poor storage. This had been
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highlighted in the ABG development plans and also by- 
Thornton. The industry needed an estimated 80,000 tonnes 
of extra long term storage space according to these 
estimates.
Grant Aid
By the mid 1980s the EU Commission recognised the need for 
additional storage facilities. Grant assistance first 
became available through the FEOGA Processing and Marketing 
Scheme in 1986. FEOGA funds were designed for non­
disadvantaged areas and provided 25% grants for long term 
storage facilities. However by 1988 there were only two 
storage projects awaiting approval by the commission and 
these were for larger merchants. Smaller growers were 
unable to afford the remaining 75% capital costs and there 
was a general lack of awareness of these grants.
In early 1991 the IFA and ABG announced the Operational 
Programme for Rural Development scheme (OPRD). This was 
designed to provide 50% grant assistance for new stores and 
the improvement of existing stores. The scheme was a huge 
success. It was 60% over-subscribed by the growers and in 
1991 alone £ 2.5 million was allocated. Merchants on the 
other hand continued to avail of the FEOGA scheme which was 
for larger projects, those in excess of £ 80,000. Total 
investment under the schemes has been £ 3.3 million for the
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OPRD scheme and £ 5.1 million for the FEOGA scheme. These 
have created a total of 50,000 tonnes of storage space in 
the industry. Further efforts to improve the quality of 
the potato have resulted in the development of new brands 
of potatoes. The Rooster and Pentland Dell are but two 
examples.
The Merchants
The truckers and lorry-men entered other segments of the 
horticultural market. They were unable to compete in a 
market which was becoming more consumer and quality 
focused. They also did not qualify for the grant schemes. 
One merchant admitted that whilst these developments were 
desirable they were unintended. As a result, potato 
federation meetings have begun to improve. This was 
attributed to better relations between the remaining 
competitors.
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(Üi) What have these changes meant for the industry ?
Growers
The growers are more organised than before. This has 
resulted in a shift in market power in the industry. 
Through the potato coordinator, growers are now better able 
to capitalise on their storage facilities. They now 
regulate supply to the market all the year around. This 
improves prices.
Regular meetings, chaired by Thornton, occur between the 
growers at local level. These meetings agree on a 
coordinated approach, so that a specific amount of potatoes 
are released from storage and placed on the market, thus 
ensuring prices are maintained. This is a significant 
example of co-operation.
Co-operation is beginning to spread to other aspects of the 
industry. For instance, some of the merchants are now 
willing to discuss quality matters with Thornton. However, 
some others still view him and his office with suspicion. 
It is suggested that one of the reasons for this is that 
some are distrustful of the pricing policy.
Despite this, Thornton is optimistic for the future of the 
potato industry in Ireland. "It is a nicer place to work 
now that there are some rules of the game. Previously it
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was chaotic...full of cowboys", he noted. Relations 
between growers and some merchants have become stronger. 
He encourages more open days between growers, merchants, 
supermarkets, Teagasc and A.B.G. to discuss strategies, 
developments, markets new products etc.
Merchants
Members of the Potato Federation are beginning to discuss 
issues such as seed, quality standards, growers and prices. 
In the past, meetings were used to give false market 
signals. They now are used to exchange bona fide market 
information. However, they are still relatively poorly 
attended.
There are also a number of other proposals for co-operation 
in the industry. In July 1995 Mr. Maurice Keady of A.B.T. 
in conjunction with the Irish Trade Board proposed a 
marketing plan for exporting Irish potatoes to the UK. The 
marketing strategy was targeted at a niche of the UK 
market. There are those who would be willing to pay for a 
premium quality Irish potato. These are the first- 
generation Irish, who live and work in the UK. This joint 
venture may involve the two largest merchants in the 
industry Me Nulty Dolans (owned by Fyffes PLC) and Sam 
Dennigan and Co. However both are sceptical about the 
viability of exporting potatoes
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There is also a proposal for a marketing alliance between 
A.B.G. the growers and the merchants, to promote the 
consumption of the potato in the domestic market. The aim 
would be to improve the image of the potato and to inform 
the public of the advances in quality of the potato in 
recent years. The campaign would be modelled on the 
National Dairy Council's promotional campaigns for milk 
products. This appears to be receiving support in the 
industry
The Market
Overall, the industry in general and the quality of the 
potato have improved. However imports are still high. In 
1992 75,000 tonnes of potatoes worth £ 11 million were
imported into Ireland. Of these approximately 21,000
tonnes were from the Netherlands (Central Statistics 
Office, 1992, p. 13.4). By June 1994 60,000 tonnes of
potatoes were imported into Ireland and of these 24,000 
tonnes were from the Netherlands (Central Statistics 
Office, 1994, p. 13.4). Despite these figures, the 
industry proposes as a strategic aim that Ireland should 
produce sufficient potatoes to satisfy the domestic market 
before the end of the decade.
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3.1.2 Irish Contract Mouldmakers' Industry
(i) Industry Backround
Industry size and growth levels
Contract mouldmaking companies engineer high precision 
casts, usually from metal, into which molten plastic, metal 
or glass are poured. This produces items which can be used 
in other production processes. Examples of such items are 
plastic syringes, toy components, plastic car components 
such as wing mirrors, and computer components such as 
plastic external casings. Therefore, contract mouldmakers 
do not produce the components of the final products 
themselves. They produce the equipment from which these 
products can be produced.
Although no official figures for the Irish Contract 
Mouldmakers business exists industry sources estimate that 
is worth approximately £ 20 million. The industry
comprises of 16 small to medium sized companies and it 
employs approximately 450 people.
Growth levels in the industry in recent years are estimated 
at 10 % per annum. This is largely attributable to growth 
in the domestic market. However growth levels in the 
industry were traditionally low. For example, in the 
Programme for National Recovery (Dept, of the Taosieach,
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million to £ 20 million between 1987 and 1992. However, by 
1990 estimates suggested that these growth figures would 
not be achieved.
Traditionally, Irish contract mouldmakers did not export 
many of their products. Many companies exclusively 
supplied the domestic market. This is partly due to the 
high costs associated with developing foreign markets. In 
addition, there was intense foreign competition in the 
domestic market. Many large customers sourced their 
mouldmaking equipment abroad. For example, in 1992 An Bord 
Trachtala (ABT) found sixteen large buyers in Ireland that 
were importing equipment.
Margins in the business were also typically low. This is 
attributable to high costs and the intense competition in 
the business. For example, some equipment, such as CNC 
milling machines, can cost in excess of £ 250,000.
Mouldmakers themselves are skilled craft workers. Wage and 
training costs in the industry are high as a consequence.
Sligo RTC and Industry linkages
Firms in the contract mouldmaking business have a 
recognised technical excellence. Many companies have ISO 
9000 quality certification and the most modern equipment
1987) forecasted that the industry would grow from £ 5
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available. There are a number of reasons for this. The 
industry has been the focus of Government economic policy 
since the 1980s. This is because it has a low volume, high 
value output. It is labour intensive, especially for 
skilled labour, and it has growth potential, through 
exporting. During the early 1990s firms in the industry 
received considerable grant assistance through the IDA.
Another factor that has contributed to the development of 
technical excellence in the business has been the role of 
Sligo RTC and one individual in particular, Maurice Doran. 
Doran has been a leading figure in many of the developments 
in the industry over the last number of years. As head of 
engineering, then as head of development, and finally as 
registrar at Sligo RTC he has pioneered and more 
importantly driven a number of innovative linkages between 
the RTC and the industry.
Since the early 1970s Sligo RTC has become a centre for 
excellence for the mouldmaking business in Ireland. In 
1970 the RTC began block release courses for mouldmaking 
apprentices. This followed consultation with the
Department of education and one of the most established 
companies in the business, Tubbercurry Tool and Gauge. In 
1983 Sligo RTC began the National Diploma in Tool Design 
and later a Tool Design Diploma which is a two year course 
with a heavy emphasis on work placement. The RTC has also 
created the National Toolmaking Centre (NTC), CREDCO - the
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commercial consultancy arm of the RTC, and TIRAC - a 
research institute which is also part of the operations of 
the RTC.
All of these developments have been significantly grant 
aided by state bodies. The NTC for instance received grant 
assistance totalling £ 1.66 million for the purchase of 
capital equipment and the building of an additional 
facility.
Finally, the emphasis in technical excellence can also be 
attributed to the founders of many of the companies in the 
business. The founders of these companies have a strong 
technical background and many of these originate from the 
same company, Tubbercurry Tool and Gauge.
Buyer-Supplier linkacres
Another important feature of the industry are the buyer- 
supplier linkages. Contract mouldmaking firms and their 
customers traditionally have long-term relationships. 
There are a number of reasons for this. The mouldmaking 
equipment itself is durable, the moulds themselves commonly 
last 2 0 years. These moulds require servicing and 
reworking and the mouldmaking companies usually perform 
this.
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Buying mouldmaking equipment can be risky. If the 
equipment does not perform to specification it can have 
serious adverse effects of the entire production system. 
For example, it can affect lead times and release dates for 
new products. Finally, margins in the business were 
traditionally low. Suppliers did not contribute for 
example to the funding for training new apprentices or the 
acquisition of new capital equipment.
Linkages between mouldmakers
Traditionally there was no or little contact or co­
operation between the mouldmaking companies themselves. 
According to Mr. Andrew Cullen, Managing director of Sligo 
based Stet Engineering, "... [t] he industry was all very 
secretive. Nobody really had any contact, even with 
companies that were nearby, and it was a case of 
occasionally saying hello to somebody buy only if you met 
them on the street", (Advance Manufacturing Technology, 
1993, p. 19).
(ii) How did co-operation form ?
Doran and Sligo RTC
In the early 1980s the need for greater coordination in the
95
industry was evident. At this time an organisation called 
The Toolmaking Association was formed to represent 
toolmakers in the industry. This association was formed by 
Mr. Reg Me Cabe of the Confederation of Irish Industry 
(CII) , which is now part if the Irish Business and 
Employers Confederation (IBEC). However, the Toolmaking 
Association did not endure. The reasons for this appear to 
be that members of the association lacked focus. 
Membership was diverse and covered a broad spectrum of the 
industry. Therefore, the member companies did not possess 
a common purpose. This ultimately contributed to its 
demise.
Despite this, there was still a recognition in the industry 
for the need for some degree of coordination between the 
members. This recognition did not arise from reports on 
the benefits of co-operation in the business. It was 
apparent to anyone with close contact with the industry. 
Maurice Doran, (already referred to), while Head of 
Engineering at Sligo RTC during the mid 1980s, was keenly 
aware of the possible benefits of co-operation to the 
industry as a whole.
Although there were strong linkages between Sligo RTC and 
the industry, these linkages did not always receive the 
necessary support from all the government agencies. In 
particular, the Vocational Educational Committees, or VECs 
who manage the RTCs. Sligo VEC during the 1980s had an
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erratic attitude to the development of these linkages 
between the RTC and the industry. Sometimes these were 
supported, and sometimes not. This stems from differences 
in opinion about the role of the RTC. The RTC was 
primarily an educational institution. But the strong 
commercial training and consultancy links with industry 
were perceived by some as increasingly important.
Political Impetus
In 1987, at Kilmainham, Dublin, the then minister for 
enterprise Mrs. Mary 0' Rourke made a key-note speech on 
the importance of industry linkages to the RTC sector. In 
particular, she advocated the establishment of Industrial 
Liaison Officers (ILOs) within RTCs, to develop this role. 
This was the important top level endorsement that Sligo RTC 
needed to further develop its role in the toolmaking 
industry. However the RTC and Doran did not adopt the ILO 
concept because they regarded this as being 'project 
oriented' . It was believed at the time that a more 
structured 'long term' approach was needed. Therefore the 
position of Head of Development was created and Doran was 
appointed. Doran believed that there should also be 
linkages between the companies themselves because of the 
basic nature or structure of the industry, ie high capital 
costs, small firms and the intense competition and rivalry.
During the period 1987 to 1990 there were a number of
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workshops held between competitors in the industry and 
Sligo RTC. The workshops were used to discuss industry 
developments. These included technological advances. They 
were also used to demonstrate certain equipment at the RTC.
In June 1990, for example, the IDA sponsored and organised 
a workshop for toolmakers in Sligo RTC. Guest speakers 
from Portugal and the UK were invited. The workshop was 
organised by Mr. Peter Joyce of the IDA. Joyce told the 
workshop about an IDA study on the toolmaking business in 
Ireland and Europe. This study showed that the growth 
predicted in the business through import substitution and 
exports did not occur, despite the obvious increase in the 
technical capabilities of the companies. The problem 
appeared to be marketing, rather than shortcomings in 
technology. Export and niche markets needed to be 
developed.
Joyce proposed a possible solution to this problem. 
Marketing Irish Toolmakers abroad was problematic due to 
the cost of establishing a reputation, a costly and time 
consuming exercise. But he suggested the costs of 
marketing could be shared among the mouldmakers. He 
proposed joint trading, joint marketing and shared 
equipment projects in the business to overcome many of the 
problems faced by the mouldmakers. He cited the example of 
a Japanese company, Munekata, which provided customers with 
about 3 00 moulds per year. However, only one hundred of
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these were produced 'in-house'. Consortia of mouldmakers 
were also common in Portugal. Portugal is the world leader 
in mouldmaking.
This development also reflected the change that had
occurred in prevailing government policy at the time.
Several reports into industrial policy advocated the use of 
non-grant based assistance, and grants were increasingly 
been seen as a blunt tool of industrial policy, (Telesis, 
1982; White Paper on Industrial Policy, 1986).
The Mouldmaking Association of Ireland
Following the IDA workshop, Doran organised a meeting 
between Andrew Cullen of Stet Engineering Ltd., Phelim Me 
Neile of Avenue Engineering Ltd., John 0' Donnell of Tool 
and Gauge Engineering Ltd. and Martin Keaveney of Tool and 
Die Engineering Ltd. This was called to discuss the
formation of an association between the mouldmakers. All 
of these individuals agreed that this proposal would 
receive support in the industry. However, it was also
suggested that the organisation should only represent 
contract mouldmaking companies (approx. 16). The remaining 
12 were approached shortly after this. A meeting was held 
in Sligo which was chaired by Doran and representatives 
from all 16 companies attended. At this meeting the 
proposal to form an association was discussed. Members
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were concerned initially with the name, policy and 
functions of the association. All agreed that the 
organisation should have a clear membership criteria.
In October 1990 the Mouldmakers Association of Ireland
(MAI) was formed. It comprised fifteen members. Doran was 
elected Chairman. One company, Lucan Moulds, declined to 
join. The role of the association was to develop policies 
and to generate additional work for the members of the 
industry.
At this time there were a number of issues facing the
industry: training, TIRAC assistance and the expansion of 
the market. The latter issue received the initial
attention of the members of the organisation. They were 
concerned to rectify the poor growth levels in the 
business. The MAI in association with ABT produced a sales 
brochure. It featured the member companies and it was
designed to show prospective customers that range of skills 
that the members of the MAI possessed. The costs of the 
brochure, which was grant aided, were shared among the 
members.
Twelve thousand of these were produced. For some time they 
lay in Doran's office in the Business Innovation Centre in 
Sligo. Gradually, however, the stock was depleted. ABT 
and the IDA frequently asked for these brochures to sent to 
customers. Doran was asked on one occasion to send 500 to
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the ABT Milan office. The IDA would show the brochures to 
buyers here, and then would take these customers to the 
companies advertised in the brochure.
Therefore, as time progressed marketing become the key 
issue for the members of the MAI. This posed several 
questions for Doran. What was the role of the MAI ? What 
was the policy of the MAI ?, what was its structure ? By 
what process could it administer a large order ?. Not all 
of the mouldmakers were equivalent. Each had different 
competencies, and if a large order was received who would 
do what ?
The Role of Experts
The MAI approached the IDA for assistance. With an IDA 
management development grant and a cash injection from the 
members, a consultant was employed to investigate this 
issue further. The consultant appointed was Jim Meehan and 
Associates of Sligo. This firm had experience of 
mouldmaking companies, multinational corporations, US 
competitors and consortia. Meehan prepared a report on the 
companies in the MAI. The study examined issues such as 
technical capabilities, management and marketing.
The findings of the report recommended the establishment of 
a separate marketing company. There were two main reasons
101
for this. First a legal structure was needed for 
exporting. Second the MAI had no central staff. Doran was 
in a full time job as Head of Development at Sligo RTC. 
Each of the members had their own businesses.
Following this, the MAI was approached by two US 
businessmen. They wanted to act as exclusive agents for 
the MAI in the US. The proposal was examined in detail by 
the MAI, Meehan and ABT and on analysis the proposal was 
unattractive. Under the agreement the MAI would ultimately 
pay most of the costs. However, it would have little or no 
control over the marketing operations. The proposal was 
eventually turned down. However, it did validate Meehan's 
recommendations that the members of the MAI should own and 
control their own marketing company.
Despite this, there were a number of members of the MAI who 
questioned the need for a separate marketing organisation. 
Some claimed that they were already export oriented. 
Companies such as Custom Components, located in Dublin, 
argued that this would duplicate their activities. Other 
companies in the MAI argued that an export drive would be 
at best short term, and that the weakness of the industry 
would be short lived. In the longer term they believed 
that Irish companies could not compete against their 
foreign counterparts in Portugal, for instance. They would 
be better off producing for the domestic market. In total 
there were five dissenters.
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The Mouldmakina Corporation
In January 1993 the Irish Mouldmaking Corporation was 
founded by eight members of the MAI. Each of these paid £
8,000 in share capital and the organisation was grant aided 
by the Irish Trade Bord and Forbairt. Two members 
eventually decided not to subscribe due to the costs of 
subscription.
The MCI needed to be staffed and it was decided to recruit 
a general manager. This post was advertised, and Tony Lang 
was chosen as general manager. Lang was a graduate of the 
Sligo RTC National Diploma in Tool Design. He had his own 
business in Shannon which imported and exported tools from 
the former Soviet Union. This made him an ideal 
representative for the MCI. Mr. Bob King of the MAI 
finally offered the position to Lang.
At first Lang did not accept the position. As he was 
familiar with the secretive and suspicious nature of the 
industry, he was initially sceptical of the overtures to 
cooperate. The success of the venture would depend on 
industry support, this would need to be guaranteed. This 
guarantee came in the form of a clause in his contract. It 
guaranteed that the MCI would quote as a group, Lang would 
make the final decision as to what companies would quote
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for, and be awarded with, any contracts that he secures for 
the MCI. This agreement was reached through negotiations 
between himself and the members during 1993.
Lang was appointed general manager of the MCI in late 1993, 
almost a year after it had been incorporated. His job 
description was manage the company's objectives. These 
would be determined by Lang and the other members. One of 
his first tasks was to become familiar with each of the 
member company's operations and products. This was done by 
spending a number of days at each member's production 
facility. He became familiar with the technical and 
managerial capabilities of each company.
The MCI holds more regular meetings than its counterpart 
the MAI. Meetings are held every six weeks and they 
involve all of the members of the MCI. These meetings had 
a number of functions, but primarily they were designed as 
a forum for sharing information and ideas for identifying 
and developing markets. The meetings are well attended and 
are chaired by Lang. Member companies are be responsible 
for "doing the ground work" for the organisation and them 
reporting their findings to other members.
It is Lang's strategy to further develop the MCI into a 
project management organisation as he believes that this is 
what the market is demanding in the longer term. Such an 
organisation would manage the entire sub-assembly
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requirements for other larger organisations. A project 
management company, for instance, could be an alliance of 
mouldmakers, mould companies, assemblers etc. designed to 
give the customer a 'complete component'. This has begun 
to happen in the market place with organisations such as 
Fullertons in Scotland and Orbitech in Ireland. It is 
Lang's hope that the MCI will compete with companies in the 
future. However he admits that he is relying on the 
continuing support of the members.
(iii) What have these changes meant for the Industry ?
The MCI has had a number of successes since its formation. 
The MCI provides members with a brand image and number of 
orders have been secured from the US for the member 
companies. MCI management is optimistic that a number of 
substantial orders will be placed by some of the larger US 
manufacturers, for example, OEM producers and toy 
companies. One toy company currently negotiating with the 
MCI, Mattel, purchases $ 1 million of mouldmaking equipment 
per month. This is large considering the turnover of the 
Irish mouldmaking market is £ 20 million annually. The 
member companies have adapted to doing business with US 
customers. For example they now prepare a quotation within 
four days whereas previously two weeks would have been the 
industry norm. The MCI is still evolving and developing 
legal structures to cope with exporting.
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Despite the initial successes of the MCI management still 
has a number of sceptics. One managing director admitted 
that he was sceptical as to the long term success of the 
MCI although he had received assurances that larger orders 
will eventually be received. He believed that there was no 
real justification for such an organisation as exporting 
mouldmaking equipment had proven to be too difficult and 
expensive. Ironically, the IDA was already successfully 
marketing the industry to foreign multinationals and the 
only reason for membership was "in case" a large order came 
from the US market. This company deliberately tendered 
uncompetitive quotes for small US orders, and he suspected 
others were doing the same. It is even rumoured in the 
business that one un-named company has already gone out of 
business as a result of costly US orders. The reasons for 
this are that the company's costs reputedly increased due 
to the need to repeatedly repair installed toolmaking 
equipment as a result of sabotage by US competitors !
There appears to other reasons for companies joining the 
MCI. Many companies have become members because membership 
of the MCI has a certain status along with for instance ISO 
9000 quality certification.
However, the main change in the business is that, in 
general, relations between the competitors have improved. 
For example, three members of the MCI who supply the same 
customer in Belfast with the same moulds even travel
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together when meeting the customer in Belfast. If the 
customer is visiting one company's plant in Sligo the other 
two competitors usually are invited to meet the customer at 
the competitor's plant. Competitors now share production 
to utilise capacity. Such levels of co-operation were
previously unheard of in the business prior to the 
formation of the MAI and the MCI.
It is not uncommon for competitors to contact one another 
if they suspect that are supplying the same customer with 
similar equipment. For example, if one company receives an 
enquiry from a customer it is not uncommon for that company 
to contact some of its competitors. These are usually 
members of the MCI or the MAI. Contact is made to 
investigate if anyone else has received a similar enquiry 
and what price they intend to quote at. If the supplier 
has contacted more than one company, which can occur if the 
order is large, mouldmakers take this opportunity to agree 
to increase prices.
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3.1.3 A Homogenous Products Producers' Industry.1
(i) Industry Background
Industry Structure
This manufacturing industry sub-supplies a larger 
indigenous Irish industry with essential components for the 
completion of certain finished products. It also supplies 
a smaller but growing Do It Yourself (DIY) market. The 
industry it sub supplies is a major employer. It directly 
and indirectly employs approximately 115,000 people. It is 
valued at 13 % of Gross National Product (GNP) . It is
strongly linked to the economic cycle. However, it does 
not export.
The industry provides small pound value items to it main 
customer. The total cost of these is only a small 
proportion of the total cost of the finished product. 
These products come in a wide range of shapes and sizes to 
fulfil a variety of purposes. Strength, reliability and 
aesthetics are important. Despite the diversity of the 
product range the products are basically derived from the 
same process. The process is a simple one with only three 
or four raw materials. The manufacturing technique is 
simple and it requires only minimal manpower, mainly
1 The identity of the industry is concealed at the request 
of industry sources.
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supervisory.
The raw materials are expensive and until recently were 
sourced in Ireland. Foreign imports are becoming a feature 
of the industry. This is because production of the primary 
raw material cannot meet demand, which in turn is putting 
pressure on prices. This production technique is similar 
across all the firms in the business. All producers 
therefore operate from a similar cost base except those who 
are located outside the main market. These experience 
higher transport costs.
Transport costs for the finished product are generally high 
this further reduces margins and fragments the industry, 
although it provides some protection from imports. Some 
large farmers have the capability to produce competing 
products at a marginally lower cost due to excess capacity. 
These farmers could periodically enter the market and 
provide lower cost lower quality products to buyers. This 
could happen during times of peak demand in the industry 
which traditionally would be in the summer months. In 
recent years this has not been a prominent feature of the 
industry.
The Dublin market, the largest in Ireland for this product, 
has approximately ten to twelve main competitors. 
Competition in the Dublin market is intense. This is 
because the products are undifferentiated with regards to
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quality. This was traditionally poor and inconsistent, 
according to the chairman of the trade association which 
represents the industry. Buyers have low switching costs 
and prices were traditionally the only competitive tool. 
Any gains to market share through aggressive pricing were 
negated by subsequent increases in prices to recover 
losses.
Despite the highly competitive nature of the business, 
there was a history or tradition of co-operation. This 
came in the form of sharing information on new production 
processes. For example a Dublin based manufacturer and a 
Wicklow based manufacturer shared information concerning a 
new item of plant equipment that the Wicklow based 
manufacturer had purchased. The Dublin company mistrusted 
the sales brochures for the item, which costs £ 80,000, and 
wanted more reliable information. Based on his competitors 
advice the Dublin company negotiated a better deal with the 
distributor for the item. To date, the equipment has 
performed to the buyer's expectations.
The industry is currently experiencing growth levels 
annually of ten percent. This is because its main market 
is experiencing similar growth levels. Industry analysts 
believe that these growth patterns have not been seen in 
the industry for twenty years or more and are set to 
continue until 1997. After 1997 a decline is forecasted 
and average or no increases in growth are expected as a
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result. This decline is expected as a consequence of a 
slow down in the overall state of the economy.
There has also been improvements in the quality of the 
products being sold. Ten years ago ten percent of goods 
produced would have been below standard, either being 
damaged during production or transport. This reflected 
inconsistencies in the production process. The product 
cannot be recycled and the only recourse is to sell at a 
loss as 'seconds' . This represented a major cost to the 
business. Vigorous quality checks were performed by buyers 
which also added cost to the producers.
However, buyers are demanding higher quality products. 
This is in response to strict new EU guidelines. Products 
for the first time need to meet certain quality criteria as 
to their size and strength. In the DIY market, customers 
are now demanding that products have improved aesthetic 
qualities and that they are free from even minor defects.
Changes in technology have facilitated these new demands. 
The production process is becoming more automated with the 
inputs being computer controlled to assure that the 
finished product met these new demands. Automation means 
that efficiency has improved and that costs are reduced 
through labour savings, more efficient use of raw 
materials, less defects and fewer returned goods. Nowadays 
only two percent of products get damaged. Many of the
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larger customers no longer see the need to carry out 
quality inspections of delivered products, this also 
facilitates efficiency. The cost of raw materials has also 
decreased in recent years as cheaper raw materials are now 
being sourced from abroad, for example, from Turkey. 
Shipping costs have also been reduced dramatically in 
recent years from twenty dollars per ton to ten dollars per 
ton. These quality advancements have allowed the producers 
to become more differentiated with respect to the range of 
products and the level of service they offer.
Co-operation has been a major feature of the operations of 
the business for many years both formally and informally. 
The industry is represented by its own trade association. 
The association has existed for many years and it describes 
itself as being primarily a lobby organisation that 
attempts to influence government policy decisions 
concerning the industry, particularly with respect to EU 
legislation effecting the industry. The association also 
collects and disseminates statistical information 
concerning trends and developments.
The industry also displays evidence of other more informal 
forms of co-operation between the manufacturers. This co­
operation comes in the form of a periodic change in the 
competitive structure of the business where tactics such as 
destructive pricing are temporarily suspended by the 
competitors. Each firm in the industry temporarily
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observes the 'rules of the game' which are understood by 
all of the competitors. This can come in the form of firms 
observing rivals' relationships with their customers and 
their market share.
During this period the primary competitive tools tend to 
concentrate on the quality of each firm's respective 
product range and the quality of the service that each 
company can offer its suppliers. Examples include: speed 
and reliability of delivery to name but two. During this 
period the industry enjoys greater stability which is 
translated into improved margins for the individual 
companies.
(ii) How does co-operation form in the industry ?
This process commences because some firms (approx. three to 
four) outside the Dublin area have relatively higher 
transport costs than their competitors. These receive 
proportionally lower returns on their sales. They are well 
known to each other and they are members of the same 
association. Most of the companies in the business are be 
family owned and therefore, each of the companies have some 
degree of social contact. As a result of these social ties 
executives begin to discuss among themselves the 
desirability of improving margins by informally co­
operating .
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To what extent these manufacturers either specifically 
agree or alternatively reach an 'understanding' to de- 
escalate destructive pricing policies and to observe 
certain rules of the game is unclear. This is due to the 
absence of a formal contract or agreement to that effect. 
Nonetheless, the accord is sufficient for them to contact 
the other competitors in the Dublin market with a view to 
discussing the matter further.
Initial contact can be telephone and usually the receiver 
is aware of the purpose of the call ever before the mention 
of a meeting is made. Agreeing to meet requires little 
negotiation other than over times and places.
The next phase of the process is to have a face to face 
meeting of all the competitors with a view to discussing a 
possible de-escalation of destructive pricing policies. 
This is the only topic of conversation, output, costs, 
margins etc. are too sensitive to discuss. Usually one 
meeting suffices and the discussions are described as 
cordial but professional. An informal consensus is reached 
between the competitors in the form of a 'price 
understanding'. Competitors agree not tender contracts at 
prices below those of other competitors and to respect 
others' market share.
Overall the process is seen as a relatively simple one. It 
is not time consuming and agreement can be reached in days.
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Customers do not react due to fears that they might not get 
delivery from other sources, and the items are of small 
value anyway.
This agreement typically holds for three to four months, 
during which the firms can earn above average returns on 
their sales. The industry usually experiences a downturn 
towards the end of the year as demand in its main market 
falls. The same firms that are responsible for brokering 
the agreement are usually responsible for breaking it. As 
market demand decreases they begin to lower their prices in 
a bid to gain market share to generate cash to offset the 
decrease in turnover.
The agreement is not terminated by consensus. It is 
terminated by companies simply dropping their prices. This 
sends a clear signal to the other competitors that the 
agreement has been terminated. Once one competitor breaks 
the consensus others soon follow and the agreement 
collapses in a matter of days.
This price understanding is not negotiated every year. It 
may occur every two or three years when the same firms once 
more experience marginally higher transport costs. For 
example in 1994 and 1995 there was no agreement. This is 
because there was no need to improve margins through a de- 
escalation of aggressive pricing policies because of the 
growth levels in the business. As the managing director of
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a large Dublin producer noted, "...[t]here is enough 
business to go around... there is often no need to out-bid 
rivals". In 1994 this competitor independently raised
prices by five to ten percent across its entire product 
range. The company's turnover in August 1995 alone was in 
excess of the turnover for all of 1982.
(ii) What have these changes meant for the industry ?
These changes result in a resumption of price competition. 
There is no alteration to the basic structure of the 
industry as a result of co-operation. Only this form of 
co-operation has been affected however and other forms of 
co-operation continue to exist. Some companies still 
informally share information concerning technical 
developments in the industry, for example new production 
processes. This has been a feature of the industry for 
many years.
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3.2 The 'Minor' Cases
During the early stages of this research a pilot study was 
conducted to identify potential patterns of interest in
industry wide co-operation. This indicated another
important form of industry-wide co-operation which was
often informal. This type of co-operation is usually, 
although not always, not officially sanctioned or
acknowledged. However, is can be functional and
unofficially tolerated, if not encouraged. Although not of 
primary focus in this research, for completeness, this 
section contains a number of minor case narratives which 
examine this important form of co-operation.
Introduction
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3.2.1 The Dublin Newspaper Industry
The newspaper industry in Dublin is highly competitive. 
There are a large number of publications for a relatively 
small population. These are The Irish Times, The Irish 
Independent, The Star and The Evening Herald. They 
compete for a market of approximately one million people. 
London by comparison has one evening paper for twelve 
million people. There is also a great deal of rivalry 
between the publications which is often based on 
differences in political ideology or reporting style.
Despite the level of competition and rivalry there are many 
examples of informal co-operation between journalists, 
photographers and editors in the business. They cooperate 
to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort in obtaining 
news stories. This co-operation usually takes the form of 
sharing different information or other resources such as 
photographs.
For instance, at the beginning of the Beef Tribunal in 
1991, the Irish Times assigned four reporters, the Irish 
Independent also assigned four and the Irish Press assigned 
three. As time progressed however the reporters agreed 
amongst themselves to operate a roster system to prevent 
duplication of effort. This allowed newsmen to cover other 
stories. Stories were shared amongst the individuals 
concerned in an effort to cover all the events which might
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occur in one day.
On occasion the agreement would break down when one 
reporter obtained a story which he did not share with his 
colleagues. However, the agreement would usually resume at 
some time later. As time progressed, editors sent fewer 
reporters to the Tribunal without fear of any loss of news 
coverage, although this informal co-operation was 'not 
press policy'.
Editors themselves are less likely to cooperate and will 
only do so when instructed by third parties. This might 
occur, for instance, when they do not publish certain news 
items during a 'news blackout' for example. A blackout may 
be requested by the Gardai for news stories such as
kidnapping or the security of political figures.
3.2.2 The Advertising Industry
The advertising industry in Ireland is primarily
concentrated in the Fitzwilliam Square area of Dublin. 
There are approx forty advertising agencies, twenty five of 
these would be considered small and these tend to
specialise in various areas of the business, for example 
graphic design. The remainder, approximately fifteen, 
perform all the activities of required to produce a
complete advertising campaign for clients, aside from the
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actual printing process.
Executives in advertising companies regularly cooperate 
with one another. This type of co-operation usually 
happens between personnel who are of similar position in 
organisations, for example, designers and production 
managers. Co-operation usually involves sharing technical 
information concerning advertising campaigns. This can
consist of pre-production work which shows how an image was
created, what colours were used, what camera angles were 
chosen, lighting etc. Designers share information
concerning concepts, designs and recent developments in the 
industry.
These exchanges can be made in social settings
alternatively it is not uncommon for executives to contact
one another at work and for the relevant information to be 
sent by courier to the rival's premises.
Account executives in advertising companies however are 
less likely to cooperate in this fashion. They liaise with 
clients and tend to more secretive about their work than 
some of their colleagues. In their view co-operation could 
result in disclosing information leading to the loss of a 
valuable client.
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3.2.3 The Grain and Seed Merchants' Industry
Grain and seed merchants sell commodity products in a 
highly competitive mature business. Years of
overproduction have resulted in large stocks of grain and 
there is increasing competition from cheaper US grain. The 
quality of the grain is strictly monitored by the Irish 
Grain and Feed Association. There are no "solus" 
agreements between individual farmers and the merchants and 
farmers are free to buy and sell to any merchant that they 
choose from. There is however some degree of customer 
loyalty or "goodwill" between farmers and merchants. Most 
merchants use aggressive pricing tactics to gain market 
share and this results in intense competition in the 
industry.
Traditionally, there has been informal co-operation between 
merchants in the industry. Merchants regularly borrow 
fertilisers and agri-pesticides from one another in times 
of short supply. It is also not uncommon for merchants to 
share storage facilities. Some employees from competing 
companies regularly socialise with one other to discuss new 
products and the creditworthiness of certain customers for 
instance. This is believed to be a valuable exercise. It 
is a source of market information that is quick cost 
effective and convenient to obtain. Prices and costs are 
not discussed.
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However, not all competitors in the industry are afforded 
the luxury of this type of co-operation. In the past some 
merchants or more specifically representatives of certain 
merchants have abused the trust vested in them by fellow 
competitors. Typical examples of this would be using 
confidential information to poach rival's customers or 
perhaps contaminating rival's stocks. The penalty for this 
has been to be excluded from future co-operation.
3.2.4 The Bandon Clothing Industry
There are approximately five clothing manufacturers in the 
Bandon area of Cork. These companies compete intensely for 
business and there is a lot of secrecy in the business 
especially concerning new designs. Despite this there a 
number of examples of informal co-operation between the 
companies. It is not uncommon for companies to borrow 
machinery from one another. Borrowing of machinery has 
reached a stage where at any one time it is possible that 
companies may not know where exactly their own machines are 
or indeed whose machines they are using. It is more 
important to have the correct machine when needed than to 
worry where the machines are coming from.
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3.2.5 Miscellaneous
During the course of the field research for the formal 
cases the researcher encountered numerous other examples of 
informal co-operation. The Monarch Leather Company located 
in Dundalk, Co. Louth, regularly permits competitors to 
view its plant and machinery, which is generally regarded 
in the business as being of a very high quality. The 
company does insist that competitors give notice of their 
intention to view the premises. This allows the company to 
ensure that no new product designs are on view when 
competitors visit.
However, not all industries display such high levels of 
informal co-operation. Other industries consulted
displayed little or no co-operation at the formal or the 
informal levels. The Aerospace industry and the Computer 
components industry are examples of industries in which 
little co-operation occurs at the overall level of the 
industry. Both industries are very secretive and 
executives at any level rarely have contact, much less 
cooperate.
The legal profession is an interesting example of a 
profession where industry level co-operation is on the 
decline. Traditionally, legal firms regularly informally 
cooperated with one another without fear of their 
respective clients being poached. However, in recent years
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this situation has changed as the number of lawyers, 
especially solicitors, has increased drastically in the 
profession. This increase has resulted in more intense 
competition, which is becoming price oriented, and poaching 
clients is a regular occurrence. This has had a negative 
effect on the propensity of firms to cooperate due to fears 
that co-operation might compromise the firm's competitive 
position.
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3.3 Conclusions
This section contained three major cases and a number of 
minor cases concerning industry wide co-operation. The 
major cases were primarily concerned with how this type of 
co-operation forms in industries. The minor cases 
illustrated another important form of industry wide co­
operation which has received little attention in the 
literature to date. This is informal co-operation.
The case narratives were primarily descriptive in order to 
allow the reader as much access to the data as possible. 
This data is interpreted in comparative mode in the 
analysis section which follows.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSIS
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Introduction
In the analysis section the data is analyzed within the 
context of the current literature on industry wide co­
operative strategy formation processes. However, analysis 
shows that no one theory or framework adequately explained 
the changes in the industries. Current theories had only 
partial explanatory power. Therefore, there was a need for 
an alternative explanatory model which focused on the 
phases of development and also factors and forces that 
drove these phases.
This model was constructed using the potato growers and the 
mouldmaking industry cases. These cases are chosen because 
they may provide complete data on what could be a more 
generic process. The HPP's and the potato growers 
industries were then analyzed within the context of this 
explanatory model. Neither of these cases provided 
complete data to fully support the model. However, data 
may support certain aspects of the phase model. Finally, 
there is a discussion on informal co-operation. It
examines the rationale and a number of key features of 
informal co-operation.
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4.1 Key debates in the co-operative strategy process 
literature.
The literature review highlighted a number of key debates 
on formation processes for industry wide co-operation. 
These debates concern whether the process is deliberate or 
emergent and the phases through which co-operation passes.
The data provide some support for the D'Aunno and Zuckerman 
(1987) emergence, transition, maturity, critical crossroads 
phase model for hospital federations. Data from the 
mouldmaking and the potato growers industries suggest that 
co-operation may have emerged in response to some threat to 
the industry. In the potato growers it was increased 
imports and in the mouldmaking industry it the need to 
enter new markets. During this phase strategies were 
undefined and unstructured. However, broad goals such as 
decreasing the level of imports of potatoes were evident.
D'Aunno and Zuckerman (1987) suggest a transition to a 
federation occurs in the next phase. Strategies and 
structures become more defined and a membership criteria is 
established. Management groups are formed to drive the 
process. Data from the cases support these findings. In 
both industries structures were established. For example, 
in the potato growers An Bord Glas and the potato market 
coordinator were formed. In the mouldmaking industry, the
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mouldmaking corporation and the mouldmaking association 
were formed. Similarly, strategies became more defined, in 
the potato business the strategy was to build storage 
facilities to improve the quality and the supply of 
potatoes which in turn would decrease imports. In the 
mouldmaking business, the members quoted as a group and 
share production in order to compete against large foreign 
consortia. These strategies and structures became more 
defined following reports by management groups. For 
example, the report of the interim board in the potato 
business and the Meehan report in the mouldmaking business.
However the data provide less support for the D'Aunno and 
Zuckerman (1987) proposition that co-operation 'matures' by 
members becoming more dependent on a federation. The 
potato growers use the office of the potato coordinator to 
regulate supply, and therefore their dependence has 
increased. However, the mouldmakers became less dependent 
on the MAI and in particular the MCI. They began to 
informally cooperate with one another outside the official 
forum of the MAI or MCI. The data also provides little 
support for the proposition that a critical crossroads 
stage was reached when members decided whether to remain 
dependent on the federation. Data suggests that the 
critical crossroads and the maturity stage may be alike. 
Firms may decide that they are not dependent the formal 
structures. However they may continue to remain official 
members for contingency reasons. For example, "in case" a
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companies.
A criticism of the D'Aunno and Zuckerman (1987) the above 
study is that although it highlights a number of stages, 
less attention in the study is given to the factors and 
forces that drive co-operation through each stage. It 
emphasises the role of management throughout the process by 
forming management groups for example. However, the 
current literature also suggests that other factors are 
important for example the role of leadership.
The data suggest that the Dollinger (1990) study on co­
operation in fragmented industries may have some 
explanatory power. However, the model does not fully 
explain the formation processes in the industries under 
examination. Dollinger (1990) suggests that co-operative 
strategies in industries emerges unintendedly as tacit 
strategies. Tacit strategies occur when firms behave "as 
if" they possessed co-operative strategies. However, in 
reality, firms are not explicitly co-operating.
Data for the potato growers, potato merchants and 
mouldmaking industries suggest that co-operation emerged 
without prior intentions of the firms as tacit strategies. 
For example, protests by farmers did not constitute a 
deliberate co-operative strategy, merely a common reaction 
to increased imports. Initial meetings between the
large order is received in the case of the mouldmaking
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mouldmakers were not considered at the time to be co­
operative strategies. In hindsight these action could be 
considered tacit strategies, firms behaved 'as if' they 
were co-operating.
A criticism of the Dollinger (1990) study is that although 
it posits that emergent strategies become deliberate 
strategies it does not suggest how this can occur. Nor 
does it suggest what other phases of development exist when 
co-operative strategies become more deliberate, unlike 
other studies.
This highlights another key debate in the current 
literature, whether overall process is deliberate 
(intended) or emergent (unintended). Deliberate strategies 
are formulated by management and they represent a rational 
and planned approach to strategy development. However, 
strategies may form in an emergent or unintended manner. 
This represents a less rational or deliberate approach.
Ring and Van De Ven (1994) suggest that the formation 
processes for co-operative strategies are rational and 
planned. They consists of a repetitive sequence of 
negotiation commitment and dissolution by the parties to 
the agreement. These are called decision making
heuristics. These processes are more rational and 
deliberate and they are similar to the process of logical 
incrementalism in strategy formulation (Quinn, 1989).
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Strategies form sequentially, making minor adjustments in 
response to new information which becomes available as the 
process advances. This is guided by an overall logic or 
intent.
This deliberate process is clearly in evidence in both the 
potato growers and the mouldmaking business. In both 
industries alternatives to problems were assessed and 
subsequently strategies were formed. For example, ABG 
constructed a development plan and the firms in the 
mouldmaking business assessed the possibility of a 
marketing agreement with the two US businessmen. Forming 
An Bord Glas and the potato marker coordinator were 
rational approaches to some of the problems that the 
industry was facing for example the lack of coordination. 
Forming the MAI and the MCI in the mouldmaking was a 
rational approach to coping with some of the key issues in 
the industry. For example, gaining members support and 
providing an appropriate legal structure for exporting.
However, there were also other processes during the 
formation which were less planned and deliberate. Co­
operation in the beginning was unplanned, ad hoc and 
unintended. There appeared to be no overall plan of action 
in the mouldmaking and the potato businesses. As time 
progressed, firms in the mouldmaking business became less 
concerned with market development. They became more 
concerned with issues such as price information sharing.
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Potato growers became more concerned with issues such as 
regulating supply to the merchants.
These constituted unintended consequences of earlier 
developments. They represented strategies that emerged 
over time in the absence of prior intentions. The 
complexity theory framework, (Browning et al, 1995), may 
have greater explanatory power for these processes than 
decision making heuristics, (Ring and Van De Ven, 1994) . 
Complexity theory posits that order can and does arise out 
of chaos even if it unintended unplanned or unwanted. Co­
operation can evolve as a result of a milieu of 
interactions between firms and not necessarily as a result 
of an overriding economic logic to cooperate.
Some of the earlier phases of co-operation display a 
process that may be explained by complexity theory. These 
were unintended actions that formed a pattern over time, 
(Minzberg, 1978). Therefore, strategies were not
formulated in advance. For example, in the potato growers' 
business protests and diesel throwing were not intended to 
force the Irish government to introduce grants. They were 
intended to force the government to do something to 
decrease imports. Later in the process a similar situation 
occurred when the firms in the mouldmaking business began 
to cooperate informally on sharing production. This was an 
unintended consequence of earlier forms of co-operation 
which were designed to penetrate foreign markets.
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Therefore, what the previous analysis shows is that none of 
the existing theories on formation processes for industry 
wide co-operation were able to fully explain the changes 
that occurred in the industries in the data. In reality 
each theory has some explanatory power. At times the 
process was deliberate (Ring and Van De Ven, 1994) at other 
times the process was emergent (Browning et al, 1995). 
Some strategies were explicit, others tacit. The D'Aunno 
and Zuckerman (1987) study explains some of the formation 
process however the model in respect to the data is 
incomplete. The role of management is well defined however 
the role of leadership is unclear. Dollinger's account 
(1990) may have some explanatory power in the early phases 
of development. However, this model is also incomplete. It 
does not suggest how strategies become deliberate nor does 
it suggest what happens when a strategy becomes deliberate.
Therefore, a more complete conceptual framework or model is 
required. This may provide for a complete analysis of the 
formation process of industry wide co-operation. This 
model needs to show the phases of development and also the 
factors and forces that drives these phases. It needs to 
be sufficiently flexible to show how strategies form and 
are formulated. Finally, it should take account of a 
variety of factors including leadership, social 
interactions and management intervention.
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4.2 Overall Patterns of Formation: A Phase Model:
The phase model presented in this analysis attempts to take 
account of the critical issues highlighted in the previous 
analysis. This analysis examines the formation processes 
in the mouldmaking and potato growers businesses. This 
data was chosen as it suggests that the formation processes 
in these two industries were similar. This may allow for 
the construction of a more generic explanatory model. It 
suggests a three phase process model consisting of an 
emergent phase, a transitionary phase and a maturity phase.
The data is analyzed using the Pettigrew (1985) context- 
process-outcome theoretical framework that was outlined in 
chapter one. Context considers the conditions under which 
co-operation forms each of the industries examined, process 
considers the factors and forces that drive co-operation 
through each phase. Finally, outcome considers the results 
of these processes within the industry and also the wider 
societal contexts.
Following this, two other cases are discussed in the 
context of this model, the HPP's industry and the potato 
merchants industry. Finally, informal co-operation is 
discussed. Table one highlights the critical issues in the 
emergence phase.
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4.2.1 The Emergence phase
(i) Context
The data indicate that the emergence phase may be typically 
stimulated by major market and environmental changes over 
which the individual firms had little or no control. These 
findings are similar to those of Browning et al (1995), 
D'Aunno and Zuckerman, (1987) and Shortall and Zajac, 
(1987). These studies emphasize the importance of 
environmental context for the emergence of co-operation 
between companies in entire industries.
Changes came in the form of threats posed by foreign 
competitors and changes in consumer tastes. These had an 
adverse effect on all firms in the industry and some 
authors have referred to them as 'the shadow of the 
future', (Axelrod, 1984). For example there were changes 
in the basic structure of the market for the potato 
growers. Consumers' tastes changed and they were demanding 
higher quality products. Supermarkets were growing to meet 
these new demands and there were regulatory changes which 
enabled potatoes to be imported in greater number than had 
previously been the case. There were also strong 
structural changes happening in the mouldmaking business. 
The industry became global and there was an increase in 
costs partly due to government policy.
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Major market and environmental changes were not the only 
factors that influenced the emergence of co-operation in 
these industries. There were also a number of cultural, 
social and non-economic factors. Tradition or experience 
of co-operating was important because participants felt 
less threatened by co-operation. They were more likely to 
initiate it themselves without outside influence. For 
example growers traditionally cooperated at a local level 
during harvest times, often sharing plant and equipment.
In industries where there was little tradition and 
experience of co-operation, the role of key individuals was 
important. Their relationship with the industry and 
attitude towards co-operation was a key contextual issue. 
The various market changes in the mouldmaking industry were 
insufficient to spur the companies in the industry into co­
operating. The leadership of Maurice Doran, of Sligo RTC, 
was also crucial.
(ii) Process
This research suggests that there were a number of 
important drivers of change during the emergent phase. 
These include leadership by individuals associated with the 
industry, protests and political lobbying
Doran displayed clear leadership in the mouldmaking
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industry. He promoted and legitimised co-operation by 
using the influence and the trust that had been developed 
between him and the other firms in the business. The 
reason for Doran's success could be attributable to the 
extent to which he was known, respected and trusted in the 
industry.
In contrast, potato growers' unofficial action in the form 
of diesel throwing incidents was another powerful driver of 
change in the potato industry. Individual farmers in the 
industry acted en masse to induce or force others 
(government) to assist them in coping with the changes that 
were occurring in their market.
(iii) Outcome
Firms in both industries behaved "as if" they were co­
operating. Their actions represented a type of "tacit" or 
"pre-co-operation" . This may be a forerunner to more
formal co-operation. The data suggest that during this
phase explicit formal strategies did not exist. Firms at 
the time were unaware that they may have been co-operating
with one another. Farmers actions were a common reaction
to imports. While mouldmakers merely attended workshops 
and meetings that were organised by the IDA and Doran. 
Only with hindsight could these be construed as co­
operation. This type of co-operation had no clearly
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strategy, although an ultimate goal may have been evident 
such as reducing imports.
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Table 2: Transitionary Phase
4.2.2 The Transitionary Phase
Context Process O utcom e
Potato : 
G rowers
•  Need to  develop a policy 
fo r the  ho rticu lty ra l 
sector.
•  Governm ent 
em ploy experts.
•  M anagem ent
- team  employed.
•  ABC form ed :
*  Potato M a rke t Coord inator
Mould-
making
» Doran's experience in 
build ing structures
•  D issenters
•  M anagem ent time 
becomes im portant.
•  Experts em ployed
•  R epartspw adC etfS
•  A lte rna tives are 
: analyzed
*  M A I fo rm ed
*  MCI form ed
(i) Context
The data indicate that the potato growers' protests on the 
growing levels of imports presented the government with 
issues and problems. The solutions to these were initially 
unclear. The IFA suggested that quotas should be 
introduced and that extra storage capacity was needed. 
However, there were questions as to how these would be 
funded and administered. There was also a need for greater 
market information and promotion of the horticultural 
development market in general.
Following the emergent phase, some companies in the 
mouldmaking industry began to discover that co-operation 
was a time consuming process. Co-operation required 
travelling to, and attending meetings, for instance. Co­
141
operation also involved other complex issues such as legal 
structuring and market research. Some companies in the 
industry remained unconvinced of the benefits of co­
operation based on their experience of the emergent phase 
and they began to dissent.
(ii) Process
One of the key features of the process in the 
transitionary phase was the role of outside specialists. 
Their role was to drive the co-operative process. 
Specialists were imported as consultants. They compiled 
reports, analyzed alternatives and developed structures and 
strategies. Examples of this in the data include the 
Meehan report and the appointment of Tony Lang as a general 
manager of the MCI in the mouldmaking business. Forming 
the interim bord which led to the creation of ABG. 
Finally, forming the office of the potato coordinator in 
the potato business.
Overall, the developmental process was slow in these 
industries. Compiling reports, holding meetings,
developing structures and strategies proved to be a time 
consuming process. Once these had been developed, getting 
overall agreement was a problem and dissenters emerged. 
For example, negotiations with Tony Lang took nearly one 
year and both the MCI and ABG took three years to form.
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( i l i ) Outcome
The data suggest that during the transition phase co­
operation can become more legitimate. It may develop its 
own formal structures for example industry associations. 
Management structures and roles may also become evident. 
The data suggest that clearly visible strategies are 
formalised and often published, for example brochures, 
annual reports etc.
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Table 3: M ature Phase
4.2.3 The Maturity Phase
|§ § | Ì I  Context Process O utcom o
: .Potato 
G rowers
» In ipfóvag m arket
Economies Of scale.
- FeW0f / ‘2f«« t grow ers.
- Im proved m arket 
in fo rm ation
*  im proved re lations : 
between «row ers.
» M arket power o f . 
m erchants.
•  fh o rm o n ’s d ire ttivo  
leadership',
% |  " ' ' ' '
: *  Seif susts in ing  .• |  
coopération.
♦ R égulation p f supp iy  to
m erçhants ' 4  |
*  Com m um ty
Mould' 
m aking ^
*  Increased tru s t /  
experience between 
com petito rs.
*  General im provem ent 
in econom y. :
*  M arket pow er o f 
major buyers.
*  learning process. •  Sèif sustaining
coopération: -
- Shàrtrig price 
information.
* Sharing production
*  Commumty
Sii?#
( ii) Context
In the maturity phase there were important changes in the 
context for co-operation. The data suggest that in the 
potato growers business the old issue of the market power 
of merchants and supermarkets became prevalent once more. 
However growers were in a position to collectively decrease 
their dependency on the merchants. This was because 
growers now possessed storage facilities. These could be 
used to regulate supply. Storage facilities were as a 
result of previous phases of co-operation.
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Growers also became more dependent on the potato market 
coordinator for information on which they based their stock 
levels. This greater reliance and commitment to co­
operation was an important feature of the maturity phase. 
There were also increased levels of trust in the industry 
as a result of improved relations between the growers in 
the business.
In the mouldmaking business, the old issue of low margins 
and dominant suppliers being able to dictate low prices 
became prevalent once more. As the levels of trust in the 
industry increased, and the firms gained more experience 
co-operating, they also became more dependent on co­
operation to redress this imbalance. This was similar to 
the situation that existed in the potato industry but with 
one important exception. Mouldmaking companies became 
more dependent on each other, and less dependent on the 
formal administrative structures that were formed in the 
developmental phase.
(ii) Process
In the growers industry co-operation matured through a 
directive style of leadership in the form of Jim Thornton, 
the potato market coordinator. Thornton wished to see 
greater transparency in the marketplace and a more 
equitable balance of power between the growers and the
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disseminating market information for the growers. This 
information was then used to decide the volumes of potatoes 
to be released to the merchants.
In the mouldmaking business co-operation matured through a 
learning process. It did not appear to have developed 
directly as a result of leadership, although this was 
crucial in the earlier stages of development. As a result 
of previous stages of development, individual mouldmakers 
gained experience at co-operating, and trust levels in the 
business increased.
(iii) Outcome
The data indicate that the result of the maturity phase 
seemed to be some form of self-sustaining co-operation. It 
was the reason why firms continued to cooperate. It
concerned what the firms in the industry wanted to
cooperate on (a firm logic) , as opposed to what the
industry officially believed it should cooperate on (an 
industry logic). Firms in the mouldmaking business decided 
to cooperate on sharing production and price information
for example. These decisions were made outside the
official forums of the MAI and MCI. It would appear that
the MAI and the MCI began to develop different goals to
that of the actual members themselves. This is an
merchants. This was achieved by collecting and
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important consideration and it is discussed in greater 
detail later.
The potato coordinator and the growers reached a consensus 
on self-sustaining co-operation. They cooperated to 
improve their relative bargaining power against the 
merchants. The original rationale for co-operation however 
was to decrease the level of imports of potatoes. This had 
not occurred, and imports remained high. This is also 
discussed in greater detail later.
There is evidence to suggest that a community formed 
between the growers an also the mouldmakers. Browning et 
al, (1995) also observed that a community had formed
between the firms in the Sematech alliance in the US. A 
culture of co-operation developed in these industries and 
co-operation became institutionalised between the firms, 
(Ring and Van De Ven, 1994).
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4.3 Summary of the phase model:
The main points of the phase model are summarised in Figure 
3 that follows:
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Figure 3: The Phase Model
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( i ) Emergence
The data show that the opportunity to cooperate manifests 
in the emergent phase. It may be typically stimulated by 
structural changes in the environment or the market for 
firms. These represent some sort of threat to these firms. 
They can be sudden or more gradual in nature and they may 
even go unnoticed by firms. There are also other important 
considerations. The most important of these appear to be 
the relations between the competitors. Poor relations can 
inhibit the emergence of co-operation.
External and internal forces seem to be important in the 
emergence phase. The internal forces may be actors in an 
industry that are directly effected by the changes. Their 
reactions to the changes in the industry may be the primary 
drivers of change. Alternatively, external drivers may 
come in the form of leaders. Their position outside the 
industry may permit them to observe changes to the 
marketplace that actors within the industry may not be able 
to perceive. A possible reason for this is that structural 
changes may be subtle. Leaders act for the greater good of 
the industry and not necessarily for personal financial 
gain.
Overall the data suggest that the process may develop in 
the absence of intentions and a clear strategy may not be 
in evidence. It is possible that complexity theory
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(Browning et al, 19 95) has some explanatory power during 
this phase. It emphasises that co-operation can occur in 
the absence of an underlying economic logic. Strategies 
form as the result of a milieu of interactions over time 
between the participants
Co-operation in the emergent phase seems to be tacit. 
Firms behaved "as if" they were co-operating. In reality, 
they may not have possessed a conscious co-operative 
strategy. Firms may not have been aware at the time that 
they were co-operating. Their actions during this phase 
may be regarded as pre-co-operation. A broad goal might 
have been evident however strategies were vague and 
undefined.
(ii) Transition
During the transition phase there was a need to establish 
structures and strategies to cope with the changes in the 
industry. This helped to build the necessary legitimacy 
for formal co-operation to operate. However establishing 
structures can be a complex task and it may require 
specialist skills.
The data show that the transition phase was characterised 
by different factors and forces to the emergent phase. 
Different drivers were appropriate due to different
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contexts. The primary drivers of this phase seem to be 
outside specialists. The cases suggest that outside 
specialists were responsible for compiling reports, 
conducting research and establishing structures to 
legitimise co-operation. During this period a clear 
strategy developed, alternatives were assessed and 
decisions were made. This process may be time consuming 
due to the need to draw up legal agreements, agree terms of 
employment and satisfy the needs of possible dissenters.
During this phase the process may be more deliberate as 
opposed to emergent. It is possible that decision making 
heuristics may have greater explanatory power during this 
phase. These suggest that strategy is formulated as a 
continuous process of negotiation, commitment and
dissolution. It represents a rational approach to strategy 
formulation and the process resembles the process of 
logical incrementalism, (Quinn, 1980). Strategies form
sequentially, making minor adjustments in response to new
information which becomes available as the process
advances. This is guided by an overall logic.
The data suggest that the transitionary phase seems to 
legitimise co-operation. Identifiable formal structures 
were a trademark of this phase and goals or strategies 
became more developed. These were long term strategies, an 
industry logic guided by a "visible hand". Goals included 
developing international markets and improving the
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competitiveness of the industry against foreign 
competition. Examples of structures formed during this 
phase were associations and consortia.
(iii) Maturity
In the maturity phase co-operation may become legitimate in 
the industry. It may have it own form and structure for 
example an industry association. These structures may be 
further legitimised if they achieve early successes.
As in the transition phase the drivers in the maturity 
phase change as new issues become relevant. Directive 
leadership may be important in this phase for driving co­
operation. Directive leadership can be an important 
catalyst and coordinator. Although firms may possess the 
will to cooperate they may not possess sufficient 
resources, for example information, to effectively 
cooperate. Directive leadership can provide these
resources. Directive leadership may be able to collect 
and disseminate information efficiently and effectively and 
coordinate co-operation. This may occur in fragmented 
industries.
Where firms themselves possess the means to cooperate, 
there may be no need for directive leadership. This may 
occur because the firms are larger and there may be fewer
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of them. The transition to maturity occurs because firms 
learn how to cooperate. For example firms may learn that 
co-operation requires reciprocal information disclosure. 
Firms may learn how to disclose this, what information to 
disclose and also the possible benefits accruing from 
disclosing information. Like the emergence phase the 
process once more can become emergent in nature. Data 
suggest that a 'self-sustaining' co-operation emerged in 
the absence of prior intentions of any of the firms in the 
industry.
The result of these processes is a self sustaining co­
operation. It is a firm logic as opposed to an industry 
logic. Co-operation becomes explicit as opposed to tacit 
in nature. Self sustaining co-operation is different from 
the initiating co-operation. It may be a shorter term 
tactical goal. This may have the benefit of increasing 
profits in the shorter term. Examples of this include 
production sharing and sharing price information.
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4.4 Do the other Data Contradict the Phase Model ?
An important consideration is the validity of the phase 
model. Although this analysis does not exhaustively test 
this, other data from the cases may provide some indication 
as to the validity of the model. The purpose of this 
section is to use other data to investigate the general 
applicability of this process model. To do this data is 
used from the HPPs industry and the potato merchants 
industry.
4.4.1 Potato Merchants Industry
The data in the potato industry suggest that firms in the 
industry were beginning to cooperate. There were proposals 
for an industry wide marketing campaign to promote the 
consumption of potatoes. The potato federation meetings 
were becoming more constructive. Prior to this the 
meetings were used as another method of competing by 
spreading false rumour to competitors. However firms were 
beginning to discuss issues such as seed quality at 
meetings. The most important issue is that data suggest 
that firms' attitudes to co-operation were changing 
although suspicions in the industry still existed.
The reasons for this appeared to be a general improvement 
in the structure of the business. It began to be
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characterised by firms behaving as 'good competitors' 
(Porter, 1985). These improved the industry structure. 
Prior to this the industry was characterised by 'bad 
competitors' such as the lorry-men and the truckers who 
undermined the industry structure with poor competitive 
practices and produce. Firms in the industry conceded that 
the relations in the business improved although outright 
co-operation was still some way off. Therefore the data 
indicate that industry wide co-operation in the potato 
merchants industry may be 'tacit' co-operation. Co­
operation may have been in the emergent phase of the model. 
It did not reach the transition phase where it could have 
become more legitimate.
This analysis suggests that to reach a transitionary phase 
the crucial element could be leadership. This leadership 
could come from within the industry itself however this may 
be unlikely. Individual firms seemed reluctant to initiate 
this process. Therefore it may be up to leadership outside 
the industry to kick start the process in the future.
4.4.2 The Homogenous Products Producers' Industry
There are a number of possible explanations for the co­
operation in the HPP's industry. Co-operation could be in 
either one of two phases, the emergent phase or the 
maturity phase. Firms initiated the process of co­
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operation in a deliberate manner. The agreement was 
reached quickly and it sustained for three to four months. 
The agreements then aborted and there was a resumption of 
competition.
Co-operation may have been in the emergent stages of 
development and then it aborted before it has a chance to 
reach transition. It aborted due to a lack of commitment 
on the part of some of the participants. The main evidence 
to suggest that it remained in the emergence phase before 
aborting is that the co-operation did not become legitimate 
and develop structures. There may have been obvious legal 
reasons for this. As there was no legitimacy and 
structures, commitment to the agreement was low and the 
agreement was be broken easily and quickly in response to 
market changes.
Another possible explanation is that the agreement 
initiated deliberately and went straight in to the maturity 
phase. However it became unstable. The principal argument 
for this is that the emergent phase can be typically 
characterised by a tacit co-operation that emerges over 
time. In the HPP's industry, on the other hand, the 
process was deliberate and the strategy was explicit. 
Firms did not behave as if they were co-operating and there 
was a firm as opposed to an industry logic to co-operation. 
This type of strategy can be more prevalent during the 
maturity phase where firms behave with the benefit of
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experience and they can cooperate in the absence of formal 
administrative structures.
However co-operation was clearly not self-sustaining. It 
was unstable and it only lasted a few months. Co-operation 
in the maturity phase on the other hand seem to be self 
sustaining, and it may endure over time. Clearly this was 
not the case in the HPP's industry.
A final explanation is that the phase model developed 
earlier may not be applicable to the HPP's industry. There 
is strong evidence in the data that co-operation in this 
industry may have been in the emergent or the maturity 
phase. However there are a number of contradictions to 
this as the previous analysis has shown. A possible 
research opportunity exists for determining a process model 
which could more accurately the process in the HPP's 
industry.
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4.5 Informal Co-operation
informal co-operation was observed as a prevalent form of 
industrywide co-operation. Although informal co-operation 
does not directly apply to the research objectives of this 
thesis, it is an important form of co-operation which has 
received little attention in the literature to date.
Informal co-operation is co-operation among people across 
organisations. It excludes co-operation by the
organisations themselves, it is a community of 
professionals. Generally, it has been confined to being 
viewed as some form of transient co-operation that either 
leads to, or comes from, formal co-operation, (Oliver, 
1990; Ring and Van De Ven, 1994; Browning et al, 1995).
Informal co-operation usually occurs because one 
organisation, or more especially one individual, is 
dependent on critical items which another organisation or 
individual possesses or has access to. These items can be 
obtained more efficiently or less costly through co­
operation. This is conceptualised in the resource
dependency theory, (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1987) and the
transaction cost theory, (Thorelli, 1986; Williamson, 
1975) .
The data suggest that there was a need for co-operation
During the course of collecting data for this research
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between reporters and photographers in the newspaper 
industry due to lack of manpower in areas such as Dail 
reporting. Executives in the advertising business
regularly cooperate to gain access to certain production 
work, firms in the Bandon clothing industry cooperate to 
share machinery. Sales executives in the grain business 
cooperate to gain access to information and special seeds. 
In each of the above cases co-operation occurs because one 
firm or individual possesses certain resources which would 
be too costly or to time consuming to attain by other 
means, for example by purchasing or leasing.
The data show that is type of co-operation may occur in 
non-competitive areas of a firm's value chain. Co­
operation of this type can decrease costs for firms, by 
borrowing machinery as opposed to leasing, or by sharing 
production as opposed to building capacity. However, this 
type of co-operation does not add distinct value to firms' 
operations, unlike more strategic forms of co-operation, 
for example alliances and partnering. Informal co­
operation is less likely to occur in areas where value may 
be created. For example, account executives in the 
advertising business are reluctant to informally cooperate 
due to fears of losing clients. Clothing manufacturers do 
not cooperate on matters such as clothes design.
There are other non-economic conditions that can explain 
the existence of informal co-operation in industries.
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Informal co-operation is most prevalent between individuals 
who are of similar professional or employment backgrounds. 
Co-operation forms between 'designers', 'lawyers', 
'accountants', 'advertising executives', 'reporters', 
'photographers' etc. In fact some organisations do not 
officially recognise informal co-operation. For example, 
it was " not press policy" according to Liam Hyland of the 
Irish Press.
These individuals or professionals are constituents of 
larger communities, which collectively share a common fate. 
Benson (1977) has also noted the existence of communities 
or 'sub-systems' in organisations which are based on race, 
social status, sex etc. The data suggest that membership 
of a community, and a sense of belonging, may be important 
conditions for the establishment of informal co-operation.
Proximity and contact between individuals also appear to be 
important. Sales representatives and journalists,
regularly meet while conducting their day to day business, 
while designers and advertising executives socialise with 
one another. Informal co-operation is conspicuous by its 
absence in industries where there is little direct contact 
between individuals. There appears to be little or no 
informal co-operation between firms in global businesses 
such as computer components for instance.
The data do not suggest how informal co-operation initiates
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in an industry. All of the individuals consulted during 
the preparation of this research noted that at no time did 
they ever recall informal co-operation of this type 
starting. In the words of many respondents "it has always 
existed". Similarly, research was unable to identify any 
industries which once exhibited informal co-operation but 
no longer continues to do so.
The cases suggest that informal co-operation may be a self 
perpetuating system of co-operation. It functions as a 
result of the multitude of small discrete interactions 
between individuals as constituent members of firms on the 
one hand and communities on the other. These interactions 
come in the form of exchanges, discussions and 'favours' 
which are reciprocated by other members at some future 
time. Informal co-operation does not appear to be driven 
by key individuals, leaders, outside specialists unlike 
formal co-operation. To suggest that it is being 'driven' 
implies that it is a phase of a larger cycle or model of 
co-operation. This does not appear to be the case.
An important feature of this system it that it may have its 
own policing mechanism. This helps to sustain it. The 
basis of the co-operation is trust, reciprocity and 
experience. This provides an important self-policing 
mechanism which effectively seeks to ensure that the system 
is not abused regularly by the members. However, this can 
occur when violations go undetected as in the grain
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industry case. Enforcement may be exercised by the 
individuals themselves and the punishment by violators is 
to be excluded from further co-operation of this type. 
This appears to have a social as well as an economic and a 
commercial stigma and violators seem to be generally well 
known in an industry.
It is possible that informal co-operation is co-operation 
that is in the mature phase of the model developed 
previously. The principal argument for this is that 
informal co-operation appears to have developed its own 
self sustaining rationale. This may be an individual or 
'actor logic' which is similar to a 'firm logic'. This may 
be possible through the existence of a policing mechanism 
which assures that violators are excluded from co­
operating .
The data does not suggest that informal co-operation has 
come from other forms of co-operation as none of the 
interviewees ever recall it starting. On the other hand 
the data does not suggest that informal co-operation has 
not come from other more legitimate forms of co-operation. 
These forms however may have ceased to exist some time ago 
and are survived by informal co-operation. Another 
possible explanation is that informal co-operation has 
evolved from other more legitimate forms of co-operation in 
related industries and not necessarily the industry in 
which it exists. Therefore informal co-operation may be
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able to spread from one industry to another.
Like the HPPs and the potato merchants' industry it is 
possible that another explanatory model may explain the 
formation of informal co-operation. Research opportunities 
exist for researchers to develop such as model or to 
investigate one or a number of the hypotheses outlined 
above.
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4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has suggested that the current literature was 
unable to explain the changes that happened in the 
industries under examination. A phase model for the 
formation processes of industry wide co-operation was 
proposed which explained these changes for two industries, 
the potato growers and the mouldmaking industries. This 
phase model was then analyzed in the context of the potato 
merchants industry, the hpp's industry and informal co­
operation. Analysis provided some support for the phase 
model however further research may substantiate this model 
or discover other model which can more adequately explain 
the process. The implications of these and other findings 
are now discussed.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS
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5.1 Implications for Management and for Future Research
The objectives of this research were to discover more about 
industry wide co-operation and its formation processes. 
The principal findings are that there is a phase model of 
formation processes. The initial rationale may be 
different to the sustaining rationale, and that the drivers 
of co-operation may change over time. This research also 
indicated that informal co-operation is an important form 
of industry wide co-operation.
Some of these findings may be of use to practitioners 
seeking to promote and manage industry wide co-operation. 
A study of this type provides insight into the critical 
episodes in the formation process. Each episode will 
present different issues for managers and may allow certain 
difficulties to be anticipated.
During the emergent phase, there is a major market change 
and possibly an emerging willingness on the part of 
companies in an industry to cooperate. However the spark 
to ignite the process may not exist in the industry itself. 
It may be up to others outside the industry, who have close 
ties with the firms in the industry, to begin the process. 
This may require certain key actors seeking to promote 
industry wide co-operation to act decisively and to time 
their actions to capitalise on the changes that are 
occurring in industries.
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Managers should be aware of the need to establish 
structures in the development phase. Expert advice may be 
required and time consuming reports and studies may need to 
be completed. Managers can employ experts, specialists, 
management teams, committees etc to complete these tasks. 
This process may take time during which the sentiments and 
reservations of members who may be co-operating for the 
first time must be acknowledged. However management may 
have greatest control over the development phase as a 
result of creating these roles.
The maturity phase may present the greatest challenges for 
managers. During this phase co-operation can develop its 
own self-sustaining rationale. It may become an
'ecosystem' of co-operation which feeds on itself. This 
implies that it may exist with or without administrative 
structures. It may become the dominant form of co­
operation which receives considerable support from the 
firms in the industry. However, self sustaining co­
operation can develop divergent goals to the formal 
structures. To prevent this, managers may need to make 
members more dependent on the administrative structures 
earlier in the process. This could be achieved by creating 
stronger links between the members and management. 
Alternatively, management may need to alter their own 
strategies to coincide with the self sustaining rationale. 
This may be difficult if the two are vastly different.
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Therefore, certain phases may be more effectively managed 
than others. Emergence and development may be more 
effectively managed than maturity, for instance. 
Management's ability to effectively manage a phase is 
dependent on the driving factors in that phase. 
Unfortunately, this can be difficult to predict. For 
example in the mouldmaking business, it was the members 
themselves, while in the potato business it was the 
leadership of Jim Thornton. However, it may be possible to 
manage the development phase more effectively than other 
phases.
Another implication of this research is that there may also 
be an learning curve to co-operation where individuals or 
firms learn how to cooperate over time. Evidence from the 
cases suggests that this may occur. For example once co­
operation gets 'kick-started' it can develop it own 
dynamic. This requires further examination to discover if 
there is a learning curve to co-operation in industries and 
if so, how this process occurs.
Overall, this study has shown that there are many 
unintended consequences of industry level co-operation 
processes. The development of a sustaining rationale and 
drivers changing are just two. Future research may 
discover more of these and ways and means of limiting these 
effects. For instance increasing member support by 
providing them with information that they really need could
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be one possible answer.
The existence of these unintended consequences raises other 
issues for managers. Perhaps the most important of these 
is can the process be managed ? As stated previously co­
operation can develop a life of its own. Controlling and 
managing this may be difficult, even impossible, especially 
when official and unofficial goals diverge.
One might ask if the process should be managed, especially 
where informal co-operation is concerned. The risks 
associated with informal co-operation are potentially large 
in the absence of formal mechanisms. Examples of these are 
"gate keepers" who control what information goes to a 
partner or a competitor and they ensure only essential 
knowledge is transferred, (Hamel et al, 1989). Informal 
co-operation has important social aspects that go beyond 
purely commercial rationale. Formalising this or managing 
this may disturb this delicate balance.
There are numerous for management issues presented in this 
study. Ultimately, managers must carefully consider 
promoting and developing industry wide co-operation. This 
can have unintended consequences for entire industries no 
just one or two companies within the industry. Managers 
need to be aware that competition is the life blood of 
industry, (Porter, 1980). Evidence form this study 
suggests that although industry wide co-operation has many
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other benefits is used to modify competition in subtle 
ways. These may not be in the longer term interests of the 
industry and related industries.
It is also possible that this study is a comment on 
strategy formulation within Irish firms. Perhaps certain 
Irish firms are forgoing longer term strategic benefits of 
co-operation for shorter term tactical benefits. If this 
is the case, the task of developing industry wide co­
operation for strategic issues will be made more difficult. 
This may also have implications for strategy formulation in 
Irish firms in general.
More focused research will now be needed to develop the 
findings of this research further especially in regards to 
the phase model. This model is incomplete as some 
industries appear to skip certain phases, while others 
remain suck at a phase. Developing the phase model will 
require closeness to data and future research may 
concentrate on a single cases for depth of analysis.
Future research should also be directed to discovering more 
about informal co-operation and also tacit co-operation. 
The data in this study is insufficient to offer a complete 
analysis. Research might discover why informal co­
operation is a prominent feature in some industries and not 
in others.
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Finally, future research should consider using 
contextualist case based methodologies. Its power and 
flexibility in being able to uncover process and content 
issues has been shown in this research. Industry wide co­
operative formation processes can be non-linear, 
ubiquitous, and involve multiple modes of analysis. The 
Pettigrew (1985) contextualist framework used in this 
research is clearly suited to this task.
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